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Misinformed Consent:
Non-Medical Bases For American Birth Recommendations As A Human-Rights Issue

A significant number of American women receive clinical birthing-option advice
Abstract.
from obstetrician-gynecologists ("ob-gyns") that is based at least in part on non-medical
considerations, without being informed of the non-medical bases that influence the
recommendations they receive. The first premise of this paper is that the provision of medical
advice in this manner constitutes a human-rights violation under both international and American
human-rights norms. The second premise of this paper is that these violations may be averted or
alleviated by greater transparency in American medical-services provision, particularly with
reference to establishment of clinical practice standards by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (hereinafter "ACOG"), and by increasing ob-gyn accountability via litigation.
These premises are examined first generally, and then with particular regard to the
formalized but non-governmental facilitation and encouragement of delivery of fetuses by
cesarean section -- a surgical procedure - via restriction of the availability of medical services in
support of vaginal birth by women who have previously delivered by c-section ("VBAC," or
vaginal birth after cesarean).
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Misinformed Consent:
Non-Medical Bases For American Birth Recommendations As A Human-Rights Issue

What we see [in obstetrics units} resembles childbirth as much as
artificial insemination resembles sexual intercourse.
Ronald Laing, Psychiatrist
A significant number of American women receive clinical birthing-option advice from
obstetrician-gynecologists ("ob-gyns") that is based at least in part on non-medical
considerations, without being informed of the non-medical bases that influence the
recommendations they receive. This professional custom may cause various adverse
consequences to the women who receive such recommendations. These adverse consequences
include: a) impairment of a woman's ability to consent to or refuse surgery or other treatment in
an informed manner; b) reduction in availability of services; and c) restraint of qualified nonobstetrician providers. These providers include nurses, midwives and family practice physicians.
Importation of undisclosed non-medical considerations into the formulation of birthing
recommendations also subverts established American policy in favor of the reduction of surgical
delivery of babies, 1 and against restraint of trade in the health-care field. 2
The first premise of this paper is that the provision of medical advice in this manner
constitutes a human-rights violation under both international and American human-rights norms.
The second premise of this paper is that these violations may be averted or alleviated by greater
transparency in American medical-services provision, particularly with reference to
1 See, e.g. , US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. Healthy People 2000. DHHS
Publication No. 9 1 -502 1 3 . Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office: 1 99 1 :3 78-379 (establishing c-section
goal of 1 5%); Cesarean Childbirth. Report of a Consensus Development Conference. N I H Publication No 822067; Bethesda, MD: Department of Health and Human Services; 1 9 8 1 (Consensus Development Conference on
Cesarean Childbirth of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development convened in 1 979 to sound
alarm over then record high American cesarean birth rate of 1 5%, which later rose to approximately 25%, highest by
far of any industrialized country).

establishment of clinical practice standards by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (hereinafter "ACOG"), and by increasing ob-gyn accountability via litigation.
These premises are examined first generally, and then with particular regard to the
formalized but non-governmental facilitation and encouragement of delivery of fetuses by
cesarean section -- a surgical procedure - via restriction of the availability of medical services in
support of vaginal birth by women who have previously delivered by c-section ("VBAC," or
vaginal birth after cesarean).
Comparative assessment of the clinical risks and benefits of various birthing methods,
locations and care providers is beyond the scope of this paper (and beyond the qualifications of
the author). Health factors specific to a particular woman or baby, i. e. , maternal age at first birth,
confirmed parental genetic risks, individual history of illness or surgery, and other patientspecific medical issues are not evaluated.
Rather, the focus of this paper is the human-rights implications of birthing
recommendations that are based at least in part on non-clinicial, that is, non-medical factors not
specific to any given individual. These factors include the larger economic context, particular
financial rewards or disincentenives from the provider point of view, the potential for legal
liability flowing from a given clinical decision, and political and social pressures of various types
that arise not from the clinical presentation of any one individual, but from the broader
environment of social conflict.
The International Human-Rights Context
The United States is one of the most dangerous places
in the industrialized world to give birth.
M. Myers, M.D.

2

See, e.g . , Sherman Act, 1 5 U . S.C. § § 1 - 1 1 ( 1 988).

2

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights . . . . Everyone has the
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law."3 Many prescriptive or proscriptive
human-rights norms relate specifically to provision of health care. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Article 25) provides: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
. . . health and well-being" . Various international documents shed light on the evolving "right" to
health, which has been recognized to various degrees, in many different formulations, from
country to country and by the international community.
The United States often refrains from becoming a party signatory to a treaty that provides
for the so-called "social and economic rights," as opposed to the "civil and political rights" on
which the U.S. is historically founded. This results in denial of direct enforcement power to
American courts of law. Nonetheless, evolving international norms - as reflected in treaties,
international custom, and pronouncements from respected international organizations such as the
United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Court, and the European Court of
Human Rights -- are powerful persuasive authority on the appropriate treatment of human
beings. 4
International standards are evidence of what the U.S. Supreme Court has called "values
we share with a wider civilization." 5 Any individual in any country may cite these norms in
defense of their rights, as they reflect the expectations of relevant actors in the international
arena, that is, the subjects of both national and international law: individual human beings. 6

3

Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, 3 U.N . GAOR, G.A. Res. 2 1 7, U.N. Doc. 1 1777 ( 1 948).
The history and sources of international human rights are beyond the scope of this paper. For purposes of the
instant discussion, international human-rights norms are presumed to have at least persuasive force. Often they also
carry enforcement authority in various national fora.
5 Lawrence v. Texas, 5 3 9 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science
and Policy ( 1 992); S iegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, "Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity," 93 American Journal of
international law pp. 3 1 6 et seq. ( 1 999); W. Michael Reisman & Eisuke Suzuki, "Recognition and Social Change

4

3

A right to health is identified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Article 1 2), which states that the more than one hundred fifty subscribing
countries "recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health" . At the international level, compliance with the Covenant is tracked
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the year 2000, the Committee
issued a "General Comment" elucidating the right to health.
The Comment is accorded substantial respect as an authoritative statement of the
Covenant by those charged with its implementation. The Comment interprets the right to health
as a web of related freedoms and entitlements, which include the right to control one ' s health and
body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from interference, such
as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. The
entitlements include the right to a system of health protection which provides equality of
opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.
The World Health Organization ("WHO") - affiliated with the United Nations - defines
health as a "state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity" . What ' s more, "the right to health should be understood as extending
beyond health care to access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health." The Committee has developed a set of criteria for assessing whether health

in International Law: A Prologue for Decisionmaking," printed in W. Michael Reisman & Burns H . Weston (eds.),
Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor ofMyres S. McDougal pp. 403 et seq. ( 1 976); Myres S.
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision," 1 9 Journal ofLegal Education pp. 253 et seq. ( 1 967), reprinted in Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. B lack
(eds.), 1 The Future ofthe International Legal Order 73 ( 1 969); Myres S. McDougal, W. M ichael Reisman &
Andrew R. Willard, "The World Community: A Planetary Social Process," 2 1 U.C. Davis l.Rev. pp. 807 et seq.
( 1 988); Myres S. McDougal & W. Reisman (eds.), Power and Policy in Quest ofLaw, ( 1 985); W. Michael Reisman,
" International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication," Proceedings of the American Society ofInternational
Law pp. I 0 1 et seq. ( 1 98 1 ); Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, "Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
R ights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order ofHuman D ignity," 93 American Journal of
International Law pp. 3 1 6 et seq. ( 1 999).
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facilities and services are compatible with human rights principles. One criterion is accessibility
of information, including the right to seek, receive and impart information, consistent with
confidentiality of personal data. 7
Certain international norms relate specifically to women's health issues. For example, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requires those
countries which are parties to the treaty to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women . . . in particular to ensure . . . access to specific educational
information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and
advice on family planning" (Article 1 0). Children are accorded similar recognition in the
international Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 24): "States Parties recognize the
right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for
the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no
child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services. "
The Preamble to the Constitution o f WHO provides: "The enj oyment o f the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition." The Convention on
the Rights of the Child requires subscribing countries to "take appropriate measures to ensure
appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers" .
According to Amnesty International, there i s an increasing body o f international human
rights law and commentary which sets out in authoritative terms the requirements of states to
protect women's sexual and reproductive rights. 8

7

See generally Amnesty International, "Caring for human rights: Challenges and opportunities for nurses and
midwives," Amnesty International Index: ACT 75100312006 (June 2006).
8 See, e.g. , Amnesty International, "Caring for human rights: Challenges and opportunities for nurses and
midwives," Amnesty International Index: ACT 75100312006 (June 2006).
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The National Human-Rights Context
In the U.S., women often encounter gender bias in diagnosis and treatment. 9 General
cultural and societal bias also play a role in influencing the quality of care women receive.

10

A

pervasive societal bias in the United States is "the fantasy of omniscience and omnipotence, as
embodied in the doctor who commands the wondrous apparatus of modem science, [and] the
fantasy of ignorance and weakness, as embodied in the uncertain, dependent patient."

11

Nonetheless, there are many pertinent enforceable legal norms. The U.S. Constitution is
generally perceived as the acme of our legal authority. Many j udicial cases inform federal
constitutional protection as they relate to giving birth. Broader doctrines premised on bodily
autonomy may be invoked in relation to pregnancy, labor and delivery, though the doctrines may
have arisen initially in other settings.
The right to refuse treatment is illustrative. Absent imposition of a court-ordered medical
guardian, the individual patient herself must be consulted for her informed consent regarding
surgical procedures and other treatment. Federal courts have acknowledged what they call the
"intuitively obvious proposition" that "a person has a constitutionally protected interest in being

9

See, e.g., Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps, Women's Health and Managed Care, 65 TENN. L. REV. 555, 580
1 998 (noting that "the mere increased representation of women in clinical trials and the handful of federally-funded
studies on health issues specific to women will not 'cure' the problems emanating from a research structure that is
accustomed to treating men as the norm and women as the exception."); Mary Lake Polan, Medical Researchers,
Heal Thyselves of Gender Bias, L.A. T I MES, Feb. 24, 1 99 1 , at M2 ; Bruce A. Bergelson & Carl L. Tommaso,
Gender Differences in Clinical Evaluation and Triage in Coronary Artery Disease, 1 08 CHEST 1 5 1 0, 1 5 1 0 ( 1 995)
(concluding that a gender-based selection bias exists in choosing patients to undergo cardiac procedures); Tiffany F.
Theodos, "The Patient's Bill of Rights: Women's right under managed care and ERISA preemption," American
Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 26, Iss. 1, pp. 89- 1 09 (2000).
1 0 Tiffany F. Theodos, "The P atient's Bill of Rights: Women's right under managed care and ERISA preemption,"
American Journal of Law and M edicine, Vol. 26, Iss. 1, pp. 89- 1 09 (2000); Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps,
Women's Health and Managed Care, 65 TENN. L. REV. 555 ( 1 998).
1 1 Brodsky book, intro p. xxix.
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left free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to . . . serious and potentially harmful
medical treatment." 12
Even persons subject to a guardianship are entitled to legal review prior to being subject
to unwanted treatment and surgical intervention. A burden of proof must be carried by the
proponent of the treatment, namely, that: 1 ) the affected individual would, if mentally competent,
accept the treatment; or 2) that there is a sufficiently important state interest which would
override the individual' s refusal. 1 3 The US Supreme Court has rooted the basis of these
requirements in the due-process protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the U . S .
Constitution. 1 4
Forging ahead to administer unwanted treatment to a person without observing these
requirements has been described as a "massive curtailment of liberty". 1 5 These fundamental
constitutional principles have been invoked to analyze the propriety of surgical and other
medical interventions during pregnancy, labor and delivery. 1 6
For example, a pregnant woman named Angela Carder refused to consent to a c-section
despite the fact that she had cancer. Hospital of ficials sought and obtained a court order
approving surgical delivery of the fetus before administering cancer treatment. The attending
physicians subjected Ms. Carder -- who had not been adjudicated mentally incompetent (nor was
12

See, e.g. , Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 ( 1 st Cir. 1 980), vacated and remanded other grnds sub nom Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 29 1 ( 1 982).
13
E.g., Jn re Guardianship ofRoe, 3 83 Mass. 4 1 5, 42 1 N .E.2d 40, 61 ( 1 9 8 1 ) (interpreting constitutional liberty
interest pertaining autonomy of the body).
14
E.g. , Mills v. Rogers, 457 U . S . 2 9 1 , 303 ( 1 982).
15 Jn re WH., 1 44 Vt. 595, 599, 48 1 A.2d 22 ( 1 984).
1 6 The legal and social controversy surrounding abortion is outside the scope of this paper. For instant purposes, it
should be noted that legal challenges to abortion or restrictions on abortion typically involve the criminalization of
an individual seeking to subject herself to a medical procedure that itself is the subject of condemnation by certain
parts of society. Forcible cesarean section, on the other hand, involves subjection of a woman to a medical
intervention to which she is opposed, thereby invoking autonomy and privacy interests not present in the case of
abortion. It is the difference between society withholding a procedure desired by a woman, and forcing a woman to

7

she alleged to be) - to the unwanted surgery. Both Ms. Carder and her baby died. In a rare
posthumous ruling, the federal appeals court held on constitutional grounds that a pregnant
woman had the right to make all medical decisions on behalf of herself and her fetus, noting that
parents of born children could not, by law, be forced to donate organs to their children or
otherwise undergo surgery to benefit existing children. 1 7 The court also ruled that the state' s
interest in the viability o f the fetus and in preventing any potential harm the mother might cause
to it by refusing treatment does not override her fundamental right to bodily integrity and to
refuse treatment. 1 8
Another pregnant woman refused a blood transfusion, prompting hospital officials to seek
and obtain a court order for forced transfusion. This time the Court declined the provider' s
request, instead upholding the woman's right to refuse the treatment i n question despite the fact
that she was pregnant. 19
At the federal legislative level, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act20 prohibits hospitals and doctors from turning away a woman in active labor, who has
approached within 250 feet of a hospital building, until she is stabilized. With regard to labor,
stabilization means delivery of the fetus and placenta. 2 1

b e subject to a procedure she does not want. This distinction has important legal ramifications within constitutional
jurisprudence.
1 7 In re A. C. , 573 A.2d 1 23 5 (D.C. 1 990).
18 The constitutional jurisprudence of pregnancy termination is distinct, as noted elsewhere.
19 In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 I l l . App. 3d 3 92; 632 N.E.2d 326; 1 994 Ill. App. LEXIS 5 0 1 ; 1 98 Ill. Dec. 267 (Ill.App.
1 st Dist. 1 994 ).
20
42 U.S.C. 1 395dd.
21
See also Wagner, M . , Born In the USA: How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixe To Put Women And
Children First, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2006, p. 1 77.

8

The constitutions or statutes of any given state in the United States may recognize liberty
interests more extensive than those independently protected by the federal Constitution. 22 A
survey of relevant state jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, for
instant purposes, that no state is at liberty to provide lesser protections than those afforded at the
federal level.
Finally, state common law may afford some protections to pregnant women as to any
other person receiving medical care, in the form of civil malpractice lawsuits or complaints to
medical boards, or both. For instance, in 2005 a Massachusetts woman sued her health-care
providers for performing an unwanted c-section on her, contrary to her previously-stated
preference for a VBAC. The jury found that the surgery was not medically necessary, and
resulted in physical injuries that left the mother largely bedridden for several years, and unable to
perform normal life tasks. The mother was awarded $ 1 .5 million for the violation of her rights,
and costs associated with her resultant injuries and home-care needs. 23
Giving Birth As An American Human-Rights Issue
A woman is a uterus surrounded by a supporting organism.
I. Gladstone, Obstetrician
The human-rights aspect of some birthing issues is palpable at a glance -- for example,
the penal practice of shackling prisoners during labor and delivery. In 2006 the United Nations
Committee Against Torture issued a report condemning this continuing American practice as a
form of torture. 24

22

E.g.,

Best v. Department ofHealth, 1 49 NC App. 882 (2002); Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hospital, 833 So.2d

l (Ala. 2002).

2 3 Meador v. Stahler and Gheridian, Meador v. Stahler and Gheridian (Middlesex Superior Court C.A. No. 88-6450,
Mass. 1 993).
24 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
GENERAL CAT/C/USA/C0/2, 2 5 July 2006, Thirty-sixth session.

9

Other birthing practices, however, require some analysis to reveal their questionable
nature vis-a-vis human rights. In the United States, most births occur in hospitals, with
obstetricians attending. In many other highly developed countries, however, including the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and Japan, midwives attend most births and far outnumber
obstetricians. A brief historical look is illuminating. 25
Throughout most of history, the primary care providers at birth were midwives.
Midwives attended almost all births in the American colonies,26 relying on skills learned in their
British homeland and passing them along. Slavery effectively imported midwives from West
Africa, who attended births of both black and white women in certain southern states. This
engendered a post-civil-war legacy of African-American midwives in most rural parts of the
South, where they were referred to as "granny midwives" and tended laboring poor women of
various races. American Indian tribes had their own midwives and midwifery traditions, now
mainly limited to work on reservations.
With its fragmented and rural character, the United States predictably developed
significant variation in midwifery practices and laws. There were few midwifery schools, and
virtually no legal regulation of the practice of midwifery (or medicine, for that matter)
throughout much of American history. With midwives tending primarily to poor, rural women who lacked ready access to doctors willing or able to attend them - there was little motivation to
outlaw midwives, who thus practiced in most states without government control or physician
resentment until the 1 900s.

25

The author is indebted to a number of sources for this overview of birth h istory in America. E.g . , Rooks, Judith,

Our Bodies, Ourselves (2005), in particular Chapter 22, "The H istory of Childbearing Choices in the United States,"
reprinted at http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&compI D=75 (last updated December,
2006); Gaskin, l.M., Ina May's Guide to Natural Childbirth (Bantam Books: New York 2003); Rooks, J., Midwifery
and Childbirth in America (Temple University Press: Philadelphia 1 997).
26 Although a physician in Staunton, Vermont is believed to have performed the first American c-section, on his
wife, in the 1 790s.
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, American medicine started to become
professionalized, with concomitant financial rewards for its practitioners, who gladly
incorporated burgeoning technology and the nineteenth-century spirit of innovation into their
practices. At roughly the same time, large segments of the American population shifted from
rural to urban settings, placing more and more pregnant women physically within reach of
doctors and hospitals. This set the stage for the on-going conflict, often bitter, between
physicians and midwives that we observe in this country to the present day.
By the beginning of the 20th century, midwives attended only about half of all births in
the U.S., and physicians attended the other half. Scholars have consistently identified economic
competition, professional and institutional needs to hospitalize birth, and gender discrimination
as factors contributing to this profound shift in maternity-care service providers. 27
The shift to physician-dominated birthing attendance became ever-more extreme as the
twentieth century progressed, culminating in an almost-complete usurpation of the traditional
role of the midwife by doctors, and giving rise to the pathology-oriented medical model of
childbirth that obtains in the U.S. to the present day. Major events in this historical paradigm
shift include two reports on medical education, published in 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 1 2, that identified
significant deficiencies in American obstetrical training, and ironically recommended remedying
the situation with the gradual abolition of midwifery, and hospitalization for all deliveries.

27 See, e.g. , Barbara Bridgman Perkins, The Medical Delivery Business: Health Reform, Childbirth, and the
Economic Order, (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ 2004: 3 1 ); Davis-Floyd, R., Mainstreaming
Midwives: The Politics of Change, Routledge, New York 2006, pp. 32-3 3 ; Wagner, M., Born In the USA: How A
Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixe To Put Women A nd Children First, University of California Press, Berkeley,

2006,

pp.

1 3-36.
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Rather than give birth at home in the company of a midwife, the report argued, poor women
should attend charity hospitals to provide training opportunities for doctors. 28
These influential reports - issued in a country in the throes of a love affair with progress,
technology, science and chemistry -- were followed a few years later by the introduction of
"twilight sleep" in 1 9 1 4. Twilight sleep was induced through a combination of morphine, for
relief of pain, and scopolamine, an amnesiac that caused women to have no memories of giving
birth. Upper-class women initially welcomed twilight sleep as a symbol of medical progress,
although its negative effects were later publicized. The opinion of lower-class women on the
subject, imported into charity hospitals as training subjects for the new medical specialty of
obstetrics, is not recorded.
Thus the seeds for bitter conflict were sown early in the twentieth century between
obstetricians - virtually all of them male, and eager to ply their ever-growing surgical and
technological skills - and midwives, virtually all of them female, already being marginalized by
exclusion from the scientific fraternity. According to a leading commentator on the subject:
Starting in the early 1 900s, physicians [who were] determined to take charge of childbirth
. . . waged systematic and virulent propaganda campaigns against the thousands of
immigrant midwives practicing in the northeastern cities, as they were seen to be the
greatest threat to physicians' attempts to take control of birth. These campaigns employed
stereo-types of midwives as dirty, illiterate, ignorant, and irresponsible, in contrast to
hospitals and physicians, which were portrayed as clean, educated, and the epitome of
responsibility in health care . . . .
Cultural, socioeconomic, and language barriers contributed significantly; even
professional immigrant midwives usually served only their own communities and were
often not aware of the existence of other midwives serving other communities one
neighborhood away. Other impediments to organization [of midwifery] included legal
and cultural prohibitions against women regarding public speaking, leadership, finances,
and so forth . . . . So in spite of the high level of training many immigrant midwives
obtained in professional European midwifery programs and their extensive experience, it

28

E.g.,

Rooks, Judith, "The History of Childbearing Choices in the United States," Our Bodies, Ourselves (2005),
reprinted at http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&compID=75 (last updated December,
2006).
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was easy for the medical profession to portray them as untrained and ignorant, and
impossible for them to combat these stereotypes in the wider cultural arena. 29
With simultaneous destruction of traditional competition, burgeoning of medical
technology, and urbanization of the American population, the die was cast for American birthing
practices for the next century. The new philosophy was articulated most famously in 1 9 1 5 by Dr.
Joseph DeLee, author of the most important obstetric textbook of the era. Dr. Lee's vision of
childbirth as a destructive pathology rather than a normal, natural function rendered the midwife
archaic, a fact he happily acknowledged. In the premier issue of the American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Dr. DeLee proposed a sequence of interventions designed to save
women from the "evils natural to labor." The interventions included routine use of sedatives,
ether, episiotomies, and forceps.
DeLee was a very influential obstetrician who served as head of obstetrics at
Northwestern University and chairman of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of
Chicago. He changed the focus of health care during labor and delivery from responding
to problems as they arose to preventing problems through routine use of interventions to
control the course of labor. This change led to medical interventions being applied not
just to the relatively small number of women who had a diagnosed problem, but instead
to every woman in labor.
American obstetrics is still functioning under the medical paradigm of childbirth it
inherited from Dr. DeLee. Other wealthy, industrialized countries have national health
services, in which elements of care that aren't needed and don't bring improved health
tend to be dropped because of the cost. In the U.S. health-care industry, the more care
that is provided, frequently more money is made by the doctors and the hospitals, so there
is less incentive to not use these methods. 30
By 1 93 5 , midwife attendance had dropped to less than fifteen percent of all births, as
compared to approximately half of all births in 1 900. By the 1 930s, midwives mostly served
black or poor-white manual laborers in the rural south. The increase in physician attendance of

29

Davis-Floyd, R., Mainstreaming Midwives: The Politics of Change, Routledge, New York 2006, pp. 32-3 3 .
Rooks, Judith, Our Bodies, Ourselves (2005), i n particular Chapter 22, "The History of Childbearing Choices in
the United States," reprinted at http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&comp!D=75 (last
updated December, 2006).
0
3
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birth to some eighty-five percent, was accompanied by a forty-one percent increase in infant
mortality due to birth injuries between 1 9 1 5 and 1 929, attributed to obstetrical interference in
birth. 3 1
Even as American midwifery was sliding rapidly into decline due to a multitude of
pressures, nurses began a resuscitation of non-physician professionalism in American birthing. A
form of practice known as nurse-midwifery evolved in the rural south, particularly with the
Frontier Nursing Service (FNS) founded in 1 925 by Mary Breckinridge, formerly a public health
nurse for the Red Cross in France at the end of World War I. Ms. Breckinridge brought back
from overseas knowledge and skills she acquired from British nurse-midwives.
Though commencing in rural Kentucky, Ms. Breckinridge actively exported her vision of
care elsewhere, for example to New York City, where she helped found the Lobenstine Clinic
( 1 930) and Lobenstine Midwifery School ( 1 93 1 ), to formalize and professionalize nursemidwifery training. 32
In the mid- l 950s obstetric leaders of several inner-city teaching hospitals recognized the
potential value of nurse-midwifery in dealing with the post-war baby boom, thus transferring the
situs of most nurse-midwifery care from the home to the hospital, and under the supervision of
physicians. Nurse-midwives were influential, in part because they won the respect of the
physician community through a required educational process sufficiently similar to the medicalschool model for doctors to recognize and feel comfortable with. Yale University School of

31 Many sources document this trend. See generally Rooks, Judith, Our Bodies, Ourselves (2005), in particular
Chapter 22, "The H istory of Childbearing Choices in the United States," reprinted at
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&compID=75 (last updated December, 2006). This
apparent dichotomy is echoed in present-day America, when some ninety-five percent of b irths are physician
attended, yet the U.S. experiences one of the highest rates of maternal and infant mortality and morbility in the
industrialized world. See, e.g. , McCarthy, M., "US M aternal Death Rates Are on the Rise," Lancet 348 ( 1 996): 394;
Wagner, M., Born In the USA: How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed To Put Women And Children First
(University of California Press, Berkeley 2006).
3 2 See, e.g. , Rooks, J., Midwifery and Childbirth in America, Temple University Press, Philadelphia ( 1 997).
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Nursing was a leader in the field, benefiting from the contributions of many distinguished and
precedent-setting midwives. These included Helen Varney-Burst, who not only advanced the
practice of nurse-midwifery and helped professionalize and standardize the educational
requirements, but also served as a chronicler of the profession itself.33
Due in significant part to the increasing "medicalization" of birth with the modernization
of obstetrics as a lucrative medical specialty for physicians, many new labor and delivery
practices developed. "In the 1 950s, women were expected to be passive in child birth. Birth took
place in a cold medicalized surrounding and the mothers were often denied information,
restrained while in labor, and sometimes drugged and strapped. To fit the schedules of doctors,
births were often induced when not necessary; other times they were delayed by holding patients'
legs together."34
Coinciding time-wise with these birthing practices, the resuscitation of American
midwifery in the nursing/hospital context provided a challenging setting in which the
contributions of nurse-midwives were especially valuable to mothers - now viewed as
"patients." Nurse-midwives were important innovators and "humanizers" in American obstetrics
units. They re-introduced the concept of family-centered maternity care (such as allowing fathers
in the delivery room and retaining the baby in the mother' s room, rather than segregating it in a
nursery with other babies), promoted childbirth education, and encouraged mothers to breastfeed
in an age of formula and sterilized bottles.
Even with the advent of nurse-midwifery, however, birthing issues did not end in the
1 950s. The physician sub-culture of condescension toward women as passive recipients of forced

33 See, e.g. , Varney B urst, H . and Thompson, J.E., "Genealogic Origins Of Nurse-Midwives And Its Antecedents,"
Journal ofMidwifery and Women's Health, 48(6): 464-470.

34 Rodwin, M., "Patient Accountabi lity and Quality of Care: Lessons From Medical Consumerism and the Patients'
Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements," 20 Am. J. L . and Med. 1 47, 1 5 8 ( 1 994).
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wisdom proved remarkably persistent. According to a 1 979 medical textbook on obstetrics and
gynecology: "The evaluation of the patient's personality need not be a lengthy matter. . . .
Character traits are expressed in her walk, her dress, her makeup . . . The observant physician can
quickly make a judgment as to whether she is overcomplaining, overdemanding, aggressive,
passive, erotic or infantile . . . . "35
The general (albeit not universal) limitation of certified nurse-midwives to the obstetric
departments of hospitals left in limbo those women who wished to resist the routine use of
medical interventions faced in hospitals, with the attendant risks. 36 This gap was gradually filled
by non-nurse midwives - the so-called "direct-entry midwives" who provided pre-natal, labor
and delivery care outside of hospitals, either in free-standing birth centers or at home births,
typically without supervision by ob-gyns or other physicians. The lay-midwifery/home-birth
movement developed during the 1 960s and 1 970s as part of "a grassroots effort by women to
reclaim power over their own bodies and births." 37 It involved primarily a small number of welleducated, middle-class, white women opting for home births, as well as even smaller numbers of
limited populations of women with specific religious or sub-cultural reasons for selecting homedelivery, such as Mormons, certain Native American groups, and so on.
In 2003 direct-entry midwives attended four of every thousand U . S . births and almost
five of every thousand vaginal births (non-cesarean). Today, the majority of women who choose
home birth are professional, white, and middle class, along with a significant minority of poor
35

J. Robert Willson et al., Obstetrics and Gynecology 5 1 (6th ed. 1 979).
For this summary of child-bearing in the U . S . , the author is indebted to Rooks, Judith, Our Bodies, Ourselves
(2005), in particular Chapter 22, "The History of Childbearing Choices in the United States," reprinted at
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&compl0=75 (last updated December, 2006). See
also Marsden, W., M.D., Born In the USA : How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed To Put Women And
Children First (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2006), especially Chapter 4: "Hunting Witches: Midwifery
In America," pp. 99- 1 25.
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and working-class women who consistently choose home birth. 38 Even so, the vast majority of
women in the United States give birth in hospitals, attended by obstetrician-gynecologists (obgyns): that is, by surgeons, whose training necessarily encompasses surgery as a standard
weapon in the arsenal against the "pathology" of birth. 39
Many people assume that doctor-provided care is safer than that provided by other
practitioners. In reality, the U.S. consistently displays one of the highest medical-error rates in
the industrialized world. For example, a recent study showed the U . S . with the highest error rate
among six industrialized nations studied, ranking higher than Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Germany and the United Kingdom, as surveyed by the Commonwealth Fund. 40
Though nearly all American women deliver their babies in hospitals, with surgeonphysicians in attendance, twenty-eight countries have a lower maternal mortality rate, and for
more than twenty-five years, the number of American women dying around the time of
childbirth has been increasing - one thousand a year, half of which are believed to have been
preventable. 4 1 If this reality is merely a reflection of the informed choice of individuals, no
human-rights issue is presented, even if medically-guided births are no safer than others. On the
other hand, if women choose physician-attended hospital births at such unusually great rates due
to misinformation about the clinical situation and options, and undue restriction of alternative
services, their rights are violated and a remedy is necessary.

37

Rooks, Judith, Our Bodies, Ourselves (2005), in particular Chapter 22, "The History of Childbearing Choices in
the United States," reprinted at http ://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&complD=75 (last
updated December, 2006).
38 E. g. , Davis-Floyd, R., et al., Mainstreaming Midwives: The Politics of Change (Routledge New York 2006), p.
22, n. 4.
39 See, e. g. , Lipscomb, G., "Senior obstetric-gynecologic residents' perceptions of their surgical training, experiences
and skill," J Reprod Med. 1 993 Nov; 3 8 ( 1 1 ): 87 1 -4 (discussing senior obstetric and gynecologic residents' self
perceptions of surgical skill and arguing a need for comprehensive reevaluation of the components of gynecologic
surgical curricula).
40 Published at www.healthaffairs.org.
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Birth Issue: Surgical Delivery
The surgical removal ofa baby from the womb ofits mother is an act that exudes deeg
philosophical and cultural conflict. 2
Although the matter is not entirely without dispute, it is generally believed that an edict
of the Caesars of Imperial Rome (Lex Caesarea) gave rise to the term "cesarean section." This
ancient law provided that any pregnant woman dying at or near term was to be delivered by Csection, that is, the surgical delivery of a fetus. Mothers expected to survive the delivery were
not, however, to be sacrificed for the welfare of the fetus. 43 Thus, the legal origins of modern
cesarean section are rooted in surgical removal of a fetus from a dying mother only. 44
Ironically, in twentieth-century America where increasingly sophisticated medical
technology was within grasp of the surgeons who came to dominate maternity care, this surgical
procedure came to be used - and aggressively promoted - in regard to healthy mothers. Csection was transformed from an effort to salvage a living infant from a dying mother, to routine
surgical removal of a fetus from a woman with a future.
A cesarean section constitutes major surgery. 45 Overall, that is, without differentiation for
high-risk individuals, it is two to twelve times more likely to result in maternal death than
vaginal delivery. 46 The doctor - a surgeon -- administers an anesthetic, drains the woman's
bladder, scrubs her skin, opens the abdomen using a low "bikini" incision, peels the bladder
41 E.g. , Wagner, M., Born Jn the USA : How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixe To Put Women And Children
First, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2006, p. 9. Dr. Wagner also notes that forty-one countries have lower
infant-mortality rates than the U . S . Id.

42

Myers, M., "ACOG's Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Standard: A Market Restraint Without Remedy?" 49 S.D. L.
.
REV. 526, 535 (2003).
43 E.g. , The Facts on File Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins , discussed at http://alt-usage
english.org/excerpts/fxcaesar.html . See also Sachs, B . , "Vaginal Birth After Cesarean: A Health Policy Perspective,"
Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 44(3):553 -560 (September 200 1 ).
44 CHRISTOPHER NORWOOD, HOW TO A VOID A CESAREAN SECTION 2 1 ( 1 984).
45 BRUCE L. FLAMM, B I RTH AFTER CESAREAN: THE MEDICAL FACTS 1 7 ( 1 990).
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away from the uterus, cuts through the uterine wall, and removes the fetus. The surgeon typically
hands off the baby immediately to another physician or advanced-training nurse to care for, then
removes the placenta, sews the bladder back into place, and closes the "bikini" incision with six
or seven layers of stitching. 47
Most women spend an average of four days in the hospital recovering from the surgery. 48
Many women feel weakened from the impact of the anesthesia and surgical stress for weeks or
months after they go home. 49 In addition, half of these women experience depression,
discomfort, and infections. 5 0
Cesarean section is the second most prevalent surgical procedure in the United States, at
just over one million in 2002. 5 1 The U . S . has an unacceptably high c-section rate, and an official
health policy is in place to reduce this rate. 52
In 1 979 the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development held a Consensus
Development Conference on Cesarean Childbirth to analyze the then record-high American
cesarean birth rate of 1 5% . The report issued two years later, lamenting the 1 5% rate and calling
for a reduction. Notwithstanding the clarion call, the rate actually rose to approximately 25%,
highest by far of any industrialized country. Some ten years later, nearly half of American c46

See, e.g. , Loma McBarnette, Women and Poverty: The Effects on Reproductive Status, 1 2 WOMEN & HEALTH
5 5 , 72 ( 1 988).
47 CHRISTOPHER NORWOOD, HOW TO AVOID A CESAREAN SECTION 2 1 ( 1 984).
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PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, UNNECESSARY CESAREAN SECTIONS: HALTING
A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC 2, p. 3 8 ( 1 992).
49 CHRISTOPHER NORWOOD, HOW TO AVOID A CESAREAN SECTION 2 1 ( 1 984).
5° CHRISTOPHER NORWOOD, HOW TO AVOID A CESAREAN SECTION 2 1 -23 ( 1 984).
5 1 National Center for Health Statistics, B irths-Method of Delivery, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/delivery.htm. There were a reported 2,95 8,423 vaginal deliveries, 634,426 primary
cesareans, 409,420 repeat cesareans, for a national cesarean delivery rate of 26. l percent. Id.
5 2 See, e.g. , US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. Healthy People 2000. DHHS
Publication No. 9 1 -5 02 1 3 . Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office: 1 99 1 :3 78-379 (establishing c-section
goal of 1 5%); Cesarean Childbirth. Report of a Consensus Development Conference. N I H Publication No 822067; Bethesda, MD: Department of Health and Human Services; 1 9 8 1 (Consensus Development Conference on
Cesarean Childbirth of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development convened in 1 979 to sound
·
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sections were found to be medically unnecessary: in 1 990, out of the 982,000 cesareans
performed in the United States, 480,520 procedures were found unnecessary. 53 Thus the problem
of a persistent excessive number of c-sections was compounded by the needlessness of half of
them.
Questions have also arisen as to a possible link between the c-section rate, including of
forced c-sections, and the economic and racial characteristics of the recipients. A national study
found that eighty percent of the patients who received court-ordered cesarean sections were
African-American, African, Asian, and Latina. 54 Nearly half of court-ordered c-sections,
transfusions and hospital detentions for pregnant women were directed against African-American
women. 55 Half of the women were unmarried, and over one-fourth did not speak English as their
primary language. 56 The same study revealed that forty-six percent of the directors of fellowship
programs in maternal and fetal medicine believed that mothers who refused medical advice when
their fetuses were "in danger" required detention in hospitals or other facilities until compliance
with the advice could be obtained. In a particularly telling and chilling response, approximately
one-quarter of them supported state surveillance of women in the third trimester of pregnancy;
and, further:
Court orders have been obtained for cesarean sections in 1 1 states, for hospital detentions
in 2 states, and for intrauterine transfusions in 1 state. Among 2 1 cases in which court
orders were sought, the orders were obtained in 86 percent; in 88 percent of those cases,
alarm over then record high American cesarean birth rate of 1 5%, which later rose to approximately 25%, highest by
far of any industrialized country).
5 3 PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, UNNECESSARY CESAREAN SECTIONS : HAL TING
A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC 2, 40 ( 1 992). See also Bates, K., "CESAREAN SECTION EPIDEMIC: DEFINING
THE PROBLEM--APPROACHING SOLUTIONS", 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 3 89, 3 90, n. 16 ( 1 995).
54 Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 1 6 NEW ENG . J. MED. 1 1 92, l .J 93
( 1 987).
55 Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 1 6 NEW ENG . J. MED. 1 1 92 ( 1 987). This
figure does not include African women, who were counted along with Asians as representing 33% of those receiving
forced cesareans.
56 Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 1 6 NEW ENG. J . MED. Volume
3 1 6 : 1 1 92- 1 1 96, No. 1 9 (May 7, 1 987), abstract reprinted at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/3 l 6/1 9/l l 92.
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the orders were received within six hours . . . . All the women were treated in a teaching
hospital clinic or were receiving public assistance. No important maternal morbidity or
mortality was reported. Forty-six percent of the heads of fellowship programs in
maternal-fetal medicine thought that women who refused medical advice and thereby
endangered the life of the fetus should be detained. Forty-seven percent supported court
orders for procedures such as intrauterine transfusions. We conclude from these data that
court-ordered obstetrical procedures represent an important and growing problem that
evokes sharply divided responses from faculty members in obstetrics. Such procedures
are based on dubious legal grounds, and they may have far-reaching implications for
obstetrical practice and maternal and infant health. 5 7
The U.S. cesarean rate increased from 5.5 percent in 1 970 to 26. 1 percent in 2002, the
highest rate ever reported. 5 8 The World Health Organization says there is no justification for any
region in the world to have a cesarean rate more than ten to fifteen percent. At the same time the
U.S. variously ranks between twenty-first and twenty-eighth in the world for maternal mortality,
a death rate that has not decreased since 1 982, and increased in 1 999. 59 The U . S . Center for
Disease Control estimates that maternal deaths may be under-reported by one half to two thirds
and that half of U . S . maternal deaths are preventable. 60
American research consistently suggests that reduction of c-section rates is resistant to
change efforts, and is more a process of changing physician behavior than of medical education
or clinical need. 6 1 Doctors perform unneeded and unwanted cesarean sections. 62 Overall, without

57

Veronika E. B . Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 1 6 NEW ENG.

( 1 987).

J.

MED. 1 1 92, 1 1 93-94

58 Citizens for Midwifery, "Cesarean Rate Rises to Highest Ever Reported in the United States," Fact Sheet (2002),
at http://www.cfmidwifery.org/.
59 See generally Ina May Gaskin, Ina May's Guide to Childbirth, Bantam 274- 77 (2003).
60
See generally Ina May Gaskin, Ina M ay's Guide to Childbirth, Bantam 274-77 (2003).
6 1 E. g.
, Main, E., "Reducing Cesarean B irth Rates With Data-driven Quality Improvement Activities," I 03
Pediatrics 1 , pp. 3 74-83, at p . ( 1 999);
62 Pamela S . Eakins, The American Way of B irth ( 1 986); Beatrice S. Levin, Women and Medicine 1 62 ( 1 980);
Judith W. Leavitt, B rought to Bed: Childbearing in America: 1 75 0 to 1 95 0 6 5 ( 1 986); Ingrid Van Tuinen & Sidney
M. Wolfe, Unnecessary Cesarian Sections: Halting a National Epidemic ( 1 992); Noralou P. Roos, Hysterectomy:
Variations in Rates Across Small Areas and Across Physicians' Practices, 74 Am. J. Pub. Health 327 ( 1 984); Carol
Sakala, Medically Unnecessary Cesarean B irths: Introduction to a Symposium, 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1 1 77 ( 1 993)
[hereinafter Sakala, Medically Unnecessary Cesarean B irths]; Carol Sakala, Midwifery Care and Out-of-Hospital
B irth Settings: How Do They Reduce Unnecessary Cesarean Section Births?, 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1 23 3 ( 1 993)
[hereinafter Sakala, Midwifery Care]; Centers for Disease Control, Rates of Cesari an Delivery - United States, 42
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 286 ( 1 99 1 ); Too Many Cesarians, Consumer Reps., Feb. 1 9 9 1 , at 1 20.
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differentiation for specific high-risk populations, cesarean births usually present greater risk than
vaginal births for women, cost more and often leave women far less satisfied. 63 Subjective
factors such as cultural ideology and fetal protectionist beliefs may influence doctors to perform
forced cesarean sections. For instance, some doctors express hostility towards women who refuse
a cesarean section based on cultural or religious values. 64 Some doctors view these women as
irresponsible, irrational, callous, or insufficiently caring of their children. 65
In one case, for example, doctors forcibly restrained a Nigerian woman to her hospital
bed because she opposed a cesarean section, removed her husband from the delivery room,
bound her ankles and wrists in leather cuffs, and performed the forced surgery on her. 66 In
another case, doctors characterized a Bedouin woman, who rejected the procedure because she
feared she would die if operated on, as ignorant and incapable of arriving at an intelligent
decision. 67
"The complex problem of physicians performing forced and unnecessary cesarean
sections on pregnant women has generated national concern."68 Earlier case law gave short shrift
to the rights of the parents to refuse surgical intervention, even on religious grounds. From 1 98 1
to 1 986, fifteen court orders were sought in the United States to authorize cesarean sections
against women who refused them, of which thirteen were granted. 69 In several cases where

63

E.g. , Cynthia S. Mutryn, Psychosocial Impact of Cesarean Section on the Family: A Literature Review, 37 Soc.
Sci. & Med. 1 27 1 ( 1 993 ); E.L. Shearer, Cesarean Section: Medical Benefits and Costs, 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1 223
( 1 993)).
64 See, e.g. , Deborah J. Krauss, "Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on
Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color," 26 HARV. C.R.-C . L. L . REV. 523, 532 ( 1 99 1 ).
65 NANCY W. COHEN & LOIS J. ESTNER, SILENT KNIFE 50, p. 1 3 ( 1 983).
66 Janet Gallagher, "Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights," 1 0 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 9, 9- 1 0 ( 1 987).
67 Deborah J. Krauss, "Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth
Decisions and Women of Color," 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523 , 532 ( 1 9 9 1 ).
68
Bates, K., "CESAREAN SECTION EPIDEMIC: DEFINING THE P ROBLEM--APPROACHING
SOLUTIONS", 4 B . U. Pub. Int. L.J. 389, 390 ( 1 995).
69 Michael Phillips, Maternal Rights v. Fetal Rights: Court-Ordered Cesareans, 56 MO. L. REV. 4 1 1 ( 1 99 1 ).
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pregnant women have refused surgery in violation of a court order, the women have delivered
healthy babies through natural childbirth. 70
The terse 1 98 1 opinion from Georgia, Jefferson

v.

Griffin Spalding County Hospital

Authority, illustrates the problem. 71 Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson opposed the surgical delivery of their
unborn child on religious grounds, but their wishes were over-ridden by orders of the Superior
and Juvenile Courts in Butts County, which authorized plaintiff hospital to perform a cesarean
section upon the mother for the delivery of the unborn child, and awarded temporary custody of
the unborn child to the State Department of Human Resources. A hospital physician had
allegedly found that the mother had a condition in her pregnancy, a complete placenta previa,
such that the unborn child would not survive a vaginal delivery, but the child would almost
certainly live if delivered by caesarean section prior to the beginning of labor. The fetus was
viable and fully capable of sustaining life independent of the mother. The trial courts awarded
the State temporary custody of the unborn child and ordered the mother to submit to the cesarean
section.
This startling issue only rarely percolates to the surface of the law. Many forced csections go unreported. According to one scholar: "The problem of coerced cesarean sections has
not received the public attention and social commentary it deserves because of the lack of written
decisions." 72
In the 1 990s, the judicial temperament seems slowly to have cooled toward tying
pregnant women down and cutting them open. For example, the State of Illinois attempted to
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See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, infra; Jefferson, infra. Physician predictions of fetal harm are often incorrect. Id. See also
George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, June 1 982, at
1 7.
71 247 Ga. 86; 274 S .E.2d 457; 1 98 1 Ga. LEXIS 6 1 3 ( 1 98 1 ).
72 Bates, K., "CESAREAN SECTION EPIDEMIC: DEFINING THE PROBLEM--APPROACHING
SOLUTIONS", 4 B . U . Pub. Int. L.J. 3 89, 400, n. 95 ( 1 995).
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override a pregnant woman's decision to refuse a cesarean section. A lawyer for the hospital
claimed that without the surgery, the baby would "almost assuredly . . . be born dead or brain
damaged. " The trial court ruled that the state could not force the woman to submit to a cesarean,
and the Illinois Appellate Court unanimously affirmed. 73 (Not long after the court's decision, the
woman delivered a healthy baby boy through natural childbirth.) The Illinois decision is overtly
pedagogical, and merits quoting at some length:
Both the State and the Public Guardian argued that the circuit court should have balanced
the rights of the unborn but viable fetus which was nearly at full term and which, if the
uncontradicted expert testimony of the physicians had been accurate, would have been
born dead or severely retarded if Doe delivered vaginally, against the right of the
competent woman to choose the type of medical care she deemed appropriate, based in
part on personal religious considerations. We hold today that Illinois courts should not
engage in such a balancing, and that a woman's competent choice in refusing medical
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during her pregnancy must be honored, even
in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.
It cannot be doubted that a competent person has the right to refuse medical
treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court summed up American attitude and law on this
issue very well in In re Estate ofLongeway: "No right is more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of [the individual's] own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. " [Citation omitted.] Thus,
"every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his [or her] own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
[or her] patient's consent commits an assault for which he [or she] is liable in damages."
[Citation omitted.]
In Illinois the common law protects the right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment. . . .
The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health ( 1 990), 497 U. S. 26 1 , 1 1 1 L. Ed. 2d 224, 1 1 0 S . Ct. 284 1 , 285 1 , held that the due
process clause of the 1 4th amendment confers a significant liberty interest in avoiding
unwanted medical procedures. Concurring with the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated that the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual's "deeply personal" decision to rej ect medical treatment. "Because
our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and
self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to
the interests protected by the Due Process Clause. " [Citation omitted.]
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Doe v . Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3 d 3 92 ( 1 994), cert. denied 5 1 0 U.S. 1 1 68, 1 1 4 S. Ct. 1 1 98, 1 27 L . Ed. 2d 547, 1 994
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The Illinois Supreme Court has acknowledged that the state right of privacy
protects substantive fundamental rights, such as the right to reproductive autonomy.
[Citation omitted.] Further, the court has conceptually linked the right to privacy with the
right of bodily integrity . . . . In Stallman v. Youngquist ( 1 988), 1 25 Ill. 2d 267, 275, 5 3 1
N.E.2d 3 5 5 , 360, 1 26 Ill. Dec. 60, the supreme court refused to recognize a tort action
against a mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries because it would subject
the woman's every act while pregnant to state scrutiny, thereby intruding upon her rights
to privacy and bodily integrity, and her right to control her own life . . . .
Particularly important to our supreme court's holding in Stallman was the
recognition that the relationship between a pregnant woman and a fetus is unique, and
"unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant. No other plaintiff
depends exclusively on any other defendant for everything necessary for life itself. No
other defendant must go through biological changes of the most profound type, possibly
at the risk of her own life, in order to bring forth an adversary into the world. It is, after
all, the whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts upon the development of the
fetus. * * * It is the mother's every waking and sleeping moment which, for better or
worse, shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for the developing fetus.
That this is so is not a pregnant woman's fault; it is a fact of life . " . . .
Applied in the context of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women, the
rationale of Stallman directs that a woman's right to refuse invasive medical treatment,
derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not
diminished during pregnancy. The woman retains the same right to refuse invasive
treatment, even of lifesaving or other beneficial nature, that she can exercise when she is
not pregnant. The potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant; to the contrary,
the Stallman court explicitly rejected the view that the woman's rights can be
subordinated to fetal rights . . . . A woman is under no duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be compelled to do or not do
anything merely for the benefit of her unborn Child. 74
The United States Supreme Court was given the opportunity to review (and therefore reverse) the
Illinois ruling, but declined to do so, leaving the parental win intact. 7 5
Similarly, in the case of In re A. C. , discussed earlier, a physician at George Washington
University Hospital in the District of Columbia decreed to Angela Carder, a dying cancer patient,
that if she did not have a cesarean section, her health and her baby's life would be seriously
endangered. The hospital sought a declaratory order from the Superior Court to determine
whether it should proceed with the procedure to save the life of the fetus. After a three hour
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hearing in Carder's hospital room, the trial court ordered the performance of a cesarean section.
Carder refused. The doctor performed the surgery over his patient's obj ection. Mrs. Carder and
her baby died shortly after the procedure. The appellate court then granted a petition for a
rehearing, vacated the trial court's order and held that a physician should defer to a competent
pregnant woman's decision to accept or reject a cesarean section operation. 76 The court noted
with great emphasis that "it would be an extraordinary case indeed in which a court might ever
be justified in overriding the patient's wishes and authorizing a major surgical procedure such as
a caesarean section." The case was not appealed to the U.S . Supreme Court.
One year after In re A. C. , the Supreme Court determined in a non-c-section case that the
Fourteenth Amendment stood for the principle that "a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. " 77 It also was given but
declined the opportunity to review the ground-breaking opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in
the Baby Boy Doe case (holding that a woman's right to refuse treatment was not diminished by
pregnancy). 78 Over the next decade, however, the social climate again cooled toward the rights
of pregnant women, and America' s conflicted attitude toward c-sections persisted into the new
millenium.
In 2004, some ten years after Baby Doe was delivered vaginally (and healthy), the State
of Utah charged Melissa Rowland with the murder of her stillborn fetus. Utah claimed that the
death resulted from Ms. Rowland' s rej ection of the advice of her physicians to deliver her twins
surgically. 79 According to commentators at New York's National Advocates for Pregnant
Women, "the approach taken by the State raises important and troubling issues regarding. the
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autonomy rights of pregnant women, as well as their right to speak on behalf their unborn
children . . . . We conclude that if Ms. Rowland is to be judged legally culpable for the death of
her fetus, then the courts must first create a new and significant exception to the doctrine of
informed consent and the common law and constitutional principles upon which it is based. Such
a precedent could introduce a substantial disparity between the rights of pregnant women and
those of all other persons." 80
At the other end of the spectrum, the National Review published a remarkably meanspirited commentary making light of Ms. Rowland' s plight. In a piece by one Virginia Graham
entitled "Give Me a "C" ! Bed rest, doting nurses, epidurals . . . what ' s not to like?'', Ms. Graham
opined about the overweight, mentally-ill Ms. Rowland:
We can only speculate as to what Melissa Ann Rowland was thinking when she said allegedly, of course - that having a Caesarean section to save the lives of her twins
would "ruin her life . " Was she about to embark on a new career as a Penthouse pet?
Model swimsuits for Sports Illustrated? . . . Rowland is now disputing the prevailing story
that she initially refused a C-section because of "cosmetic motivations. " Given that she
reportedly weighs 3 5 0 pounds, maybe she's telling the truth . . . . Now, no one wants to see
a woman who just gave birth sitting in jail when she should be home nursing the
surviving infant - assuming, of course, that breastfeeding wouldn't ruin her life . . . .
She appears to be the kind of reckless reproducer that makes otherwise reasonable
people yearn - just for a minute - for a Homeland Bureau of Pregnancy Licensing . . . .
But let's assume, just for the heck of it, that Rowland wasn't just concerned about how
fetching her naked body would look to future suitors. What if she really did fear surgery?
Even with the C-section rate exceeding 25 percent nationwide, driven upward in part by
women who would rather not labor, the worry warts insist on calling it "Major Surgery,"
and sure, there are some risks. But as Major Surgery goes, a C-section - without
complications, and with a good insurer - is a pretty good deal. . . .
Maybe Melissa Rowland really was terrified at the prospect of surgery, and her
doctors failed her by not adequately addressing those fears. Does fear, born of ignorance,
make her less culpable for her baby's death? 8 1
Ms. Graham' s caustic humor at the expense of women undergoing major surgery they
don't want is hardly original. In a telling display of what many of the surgeons themselves find
80
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funny, the humor magazine Journal OfIrreproducible Results

-

which solicits articles that

"appeal to scientists, doctors, and engineers" 82 - published a bogus research study summary
entitled "The Reciprocal Natural Childbirth Index." The Index, posted in at least one Ivy League
medical school, 83 added "points" to a woman's childbirth-services score if: she or another person
check her cervix prior to arrival at the hospital; she or her husband has a hyphenated last name;
she has more than four years of college; she has a written birth plan; she is insured by a managed
health care plan; and other rollicking factors. Concludes the author:
We have found that a Reciprocal Natural Childbirth Index score of 30 or greater should
earn the woman in labor immediate consideration for cesarean section. In fact, since you
can get a score of 30 without even being in labor, someone with a high enough score
could be offered a C-section at her convenience during regular working hours. 84
Ms. Rowland is not alone in being deemed a criminal for her maternity conduct. Certain
states in the U.S. have, in recent years, pursued increasingly aggressive prosecution of pregnant
women who are deemed to have failed at pre-natal care. A prime example is South Carolina,
whose Supreme Court has applied to fetal health a state statute punishing child abuse, upholding
a murder conviction arising from a stillbirth to a mother who had taken cocaine during her
pregnancy. The State court observed in 2003 :
The drug "cocaine" has torn at the very fabric of our nation. Families have been ripped
apart, minds have been ruined, and lives have been lost. It is common knowledge that the
drug is highly addictive and potentially fatal. The addictive nature of the drug, combined
with its expense, has caused our prisons to swell with those who have been motivated to
support their drug habit through criminal acts. In some areas of the world, entire
governments have been undermined by the cocaine industry. 85
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The jury was unable to return a verdict, so the prosecution re-brought the action and, on round
two, won a conviction. South Carolina is the only state where the courts have included viable
fetuses within the scope of child abuse laws in an attempt to prosecute pregnant women. The
U. S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter.
Meanwhile, the American College Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG")
continues to ask: "Should Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Delivery Be a Criminal Offense?"86
ACOG And VBAC
The organization that claims to be the "nation' s leading authority on women' s health for
more than 50 years" is the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ACOG boasts
a membership that includes more than 90% of all American board-certified ob-gyns, and is the
self-described "voice of women's health". 87 It sets the standards for obstetrical practice in this
country, in large part because of its members' belief that "failure to comply with the ACOG
recommendations will increase medical legal risks should a poor outcome be experienced." 88 Its
members testify before U . S . Congress committees on the formulation of public policy. 89 Its
practice standards govern not only dispensation of services to women, but also whether the
service will be covered by health insurance, with insurance companies routinely monitoring
changes in ACOG policies to adjust their coverage accordingly. 90
Membership is limited to obstetrician-gynecologists. It is, in fact, a trade association:
86 EDITORIAL S : Richard L. Berkowitz, Should Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Delivery Be a Criminal Offense?
Obstet. Gynecol., Dec 2004; 1 04 : 1 220 - 1 22 1 .
8 7 ACOG News Release, May 9, 2007, published at
http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr05-09-07- l .cfrn.
8 8 D' Angelo, R., Comment On "Neonatal Morbidity Associated with Uterine Rupture: What Are the Risk Factors?",
by Bujold E., American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 2002 ; 1 86 : 3 1 1 -4, Comment published at Obstetric
Anesthesia Digest September 2002 : 1 32.
89 E.g., testimony of Dr. Shelby Wilbourne, U . S . Senate Committee on the Judiciary, February 1 1 , 2003, published
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=600&wit_id= J 595.
90 See, e.g. , Premier AEIX Risk E-lert Newsletter, ACOG updates labor and delivery best practices," January 1 3 ,
2006, published at htt;://www.premierinc.com/risk/education-newsletters/risk-e-lert/2006/J anuary06 .j sp; Aetna,
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ACOG is not a college in the sense of an institution of higher learning, nor is it a
scientific body. It is a "professional organization" that in reality is one kind of trade
union. Like every trade union, ACOG has two goals: promote the interests of its
members, and promote a better product (in this case, well-being of women). 9 1
One-third of all cesareans are performed o n women who have had at least one cesarean in
the past. 92 This reflects the traditional American physician's wisdom, "once a cesarean, always a
cesarean. "93 Yet there are many women who, having delivered surgically in the past, wish to
deliver vaginally. These women are designated as "VBACs" - vaginal birth after cesarean.
Many hospitals mandate that any pregnant patient who has previously undergone uterine
surgery (including a c-section) must deliver surgically if the delivery is to take place on hospital
premises. Dr. Marsden Wagner, M.D., a perinatal epidemiologist and former Director of the
European Regional Office of the Women and Children' s Health for the World Health
Organization, has called this trend in American hospitals a "widespread failure to honor the
rights of pregnant and birthing women". 94
For purposes of the instant paper, the question is not whether VBAC is desirable from a
medical point of view. Analysis of the merits of any given medical decision to assist or deny
VBAC is beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this work is identification and analysis of
non-medical motivations in the formulation of clinical recommendations for or against surgical
intervention in the birth process, specifically, cesarean section for a woman who has previously
delivered surgically but wishes to deliver vaginally from a subsequent pregnancy.

"Clinical Policy Bulletin: Home B irths"," Policy No. 0329, Review Date June 26, 2007, published at
http://www/aetna.com/cpb/medical/data/3 00_3 99/0329 .html.
91 Wagner, M., "What Every M i dwife Should Know About ACOG and VBAC: Critique of ACOG Practice Bulletin
No. 5, July 1 999, "Vaginal B irth After Previous Cesarean Section," Midwifery Today, published at
http://www.midwiferytoday.com/articles/acog.asp.
92 E.g. , ACOG (PB #5 1 999).
9 3 See, e. g. , Flamm, B., "Once A Cesarean, Always A Controversy," 90 Obstetrics & Gynecology 2 : 3 1 2-5 ( 1 997);
Bruce L. Flamm, MD, "Vaginal Birth After Cesarean and the New England Journal of Medicine: A Strange
Controversy," Birth 2 8 :4 December 200 1 , available at http://www.vbac.com/hottopic/vbac-flamm.html.
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That is, does the formulation of clinical standards and recommendations in favor of
surgical delivery for women who have delivered in that manner before, based on non-clinical
considerations such as financial reward and limitation of legal liability, violate the rights of
pregnant woman who wish to refuse surgical intervention in the birthing process?
Restriction Of VBAC By ACOG For Non-Medical Reasons
ACOG acknowledges the impropriety of basing patient health recommendations on
financial considerations. According to the ACOG Code of Ethics, "the welfare of the patient
must form the basis of all medical judgments." It describes the "right of individual patients to
make their own choices about their health care" as "fundamental", and specifically identifies
financial constraints as a conflict of interest that must be disclosed to the patient. (ACOG Code
2004.)
ACOG does not dispute that VBAC is safe: "Over the past 30 years, more than 50 studies
have documented the safety of VBAC."95 For years ACOG has acknowledged the "strong
consensus that trial of labor is appropriate for most women" with a history of C-section and the
general agreement that the U. S. C-section rate is high. 96
Of course, repeat C-section may be indicated for clinical reasons in the case of any
particular individual patient. The question under discussion is whether ACOG discourages
VBAC deliveries for non-medical reasons.
Despite its own ethical norms, there is substantial evidence that ACOG systematically
and knowingly facilitates restriction of the access of pregnant women to medical and nonmedical services in support of VBAC, not for the health of the mothers and babies involv.ed, but
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for the financial benefit of its physician members in three ways: a) to increase their
compensation for a delivery via selection of a more lucrative procedure; b) to protect their assets
by shielding them from liability; and c) by maximizing the profitability of medical facilities in
which a physician has a vested, albeit perhaps indirect, interest.
In 1 997, ACOG published an article by a member physician that stated frankly: "For the
physician, elective repeat cesarean offers advantages, including convenience, time savings, and
sometimes increased compensation."97
Two years later, ACOG noted that one-third of all C-sections were performed on patients
who previously delivered surgically. ACOG expressly related the increased C-section rate to the
"increased medical-legal pressures" faced by American physicians arising from claims related to
fetal morbidity and mortality, and admitted at the same time that the increase in C-sections as a
reaction to those claims had not proven to be an improvement in terms of newborn outcome. 98
Indeed, ACOG reminded its membership that complications arising from any
unsuccessful trial of labor have increasingly "led to malpractice suits" whether or not a VBAC
was involved. VBAC - a large subset of all cesareans -- was thus a tool ready to hand: reducing
the number of VBA Cs via restriction of their availability was a way to reduce the overall number
of trials of labor, in tum decreasing the specter of legal liability for malpractice during trials of
labor.
It was this desire to limit members' liability to patients that led ACOG to acknowledge a
"need to reevaluate VBAC recommendations."99 One of the sources cited by ACOG in its
reevaluation was entitled "Characteristics of successful claims for payment by the Florida

Flamm, B., "Once A Cesarean, Always A Controversy," 90 Obstetrics & Gynecology 2 : 3 1 2-5, 3 1 3 ( 1 997).
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99 ACOG Practice Bulletin #5 1 999, p. 2 .
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Neurologic Injury Compensation Association Fund," another ACOG publication. 1 00 Not
surprisingly, the "reevaluated" VBAC recommendations placed a virtual chokehold on VBACs,
severely limiting them to maj or regional hospitals that could supply the extensive battery of
high-tech equipment and personnel required under the new guidelines.
ACOG Vice-President of Practice Activities, Stanley Zinberg, M.D., admitted to fellow
professionals the financial nature of ACOG's discouragement of VBACs, in noting that the
admittedly small risk of uterine rupture in a VBAC woman
is often accompanied by legal action no matter what the clinical outcome or how
excellent the clinical care. Defendant physicians and hospital are in a better position
from a liability perspective if the physicians were present at the time of the complication.
The College recognizes the implications such immediate availability has for small
hospitals, for the practice patterns of obstetricians and anesthesiologists and for the
incidence of VBAC in general. . . . 1 0 1
Dr. Zinberg characterizes VBAC as both an "obstetric emergency" and an "elective
procedure". 1 02
Practice Bulletin #5 is billed as part of the "clinical management guidelines for
obstetrician-gynecologists," presumably rendering it subject to ACOG's ethical maxims that
such decisions must be based on patient welfare and not on conflicting financial constraints. Yet
the Bulletin text itself expressly manifests the non-clinical factors at play:
It is often stated that the cost of VBAC is less than that of repeat cesarean delivery.
However, for a true analysis of all the costs one has to include the costs to the hospital,
the method of reimbursement (i.e., per diem diagnosis-related group or capitation), and
medical malpractice payments . . . . Increased time or attendance for a woman undergoing
a trial of labor results in increased cost to the physician. The difficulty in assessing the
cost benefit of VBAC is that the costs are not all incurred by one entity.
100
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(ACOG Practice Bulletin #5 1 999, p. 3) (emphasis added).
According to ACOG practice ethics, however, there is only one entity whose welfare
governs clinical judgments: the patient. 103 Yet the clinical guidelines proffered by ACOG to its
member physicians expressly consider lawsuits, medical malpractice payments, rates of
compensation, cost to the hospital, and cost to the physician. As Dr. Flamm had asked two years
earlier in regard to earlier VBAC restrictions: "Is this good medicine or just a misguided attempt
at risk management?" 104
Nonetheless, the practice guideline set forth in Practice Bulletin #5 set severe restrictions
on the practical availability of professional services to women seeking a VBAC, despite the
acknowledged absence of good and consistent scientific evidence supporting the
recommendation: "VBAC should be attempted in institutions equipped to respond to
emergencies with physicians immediately available to provide emergency care." It further
recommended that the decision to proceed with a VBAC be made not by the "patient" herself,
but rather by "the patient and her physician" (ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, p. 5), despite the
ethical prescription for the fundamental right of individual patients to make their own choices
about their health care.
In 2004 ACOG replaced Practice Bulletin #5 with Practice Bulletin #54. ACOG had
apparently learned something from the controversy generated by its candor in 1 999: its
previously-frank references to "malpractice suits" were omitted. Nonetheless, the key restrictive
provision functionally limiting the availability of VBAC services was carried forward and is in
effect to the present day: "VBAC should be attempted in institutions equipped to respond to

toJ Conflicts between the welfare of the mother giving birth and the baby and/or fetus are beyond the scope of this
paper. For purposes of the issue at hand, it is safe to assume that the discussion is limited to those instances where
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emergencies with physicians immediately available to provide emergency care." 1 05 This
language is a direct carry-over from the 1 999 Bulletin, and had been previously criticized for its
adverse impact on availability of VBAC services:
The first Level C recommendation, "VBAC should be attempted in institutions equipped
to respond to emergencies with physicians immediately available to provide emergency
care," has a huge impact on the system of maternity care in the United States that goes far
beyond obstetric practice. If this policy is followed, it drastically reduces or eliminates
several options available to women with previous cesarean section, including having their
birth at home, in a freestanding birth center or in a small community hospital. Because of
all the unnecessary cesarean section in the past, American women with a scarred uterus
are a significant minority of pregnant women-in the neighborhood of 1 5 percent. If the
nearest large hospital is at some distance, it makes a family-centered birth difficult or
impossible and is likely to eliminate continuity of care throughout pregnancy and birth.
Scientific data show such continuity of care significantly improves birth outcomes. 1 06
According to another medical commentator:
The conclusions of the current study and the phrase "immediately available" from the
ACOG bulletin have significant implications for both anesthesia and obstetric care
providers whose practices have been based on a home call system. No longer is it simply
enough to make the incision within 30 min of the decision for cesarean section; now they
must remain immediately availablewhen patients attempt VBAC if they want to comply
with these recommendations. To do so practices must be altered to take "in-hospital,"
which is simply not feasible in many rural practices. Alternative solutions include not
allowing patients to attempt VBAC (elective repeat cesarean sections only) or
transferring patients that desire a trial of labor to a tertiary care center where the care
providers are immediately available for emergencies. 1 07
ACOG' s clear ulterior financial motives are also at play in the "reevaluated" ACOG standards:
ACOG's primary allegiance to the needs of its members over the needs of women and
families requires their recommendations to be suspect unless confirmed by overwhelming
scientific evidence. As ACOG recommendations come from a single-specialty
organization, they always must be carefully evaluated as to bias and should never be the
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sole basis, nor even the most important justification, for maternity care policy in the
United States. 1 08
Independent Research Acknowledges the ACOG Problem
Researchers from different disciplines are in accord with ACOG' s own admissions on its
role in restriction of VBAC services and availability. For example, economists at Tulane
University have written:
Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that risk of malpractice lawsuits encourages
physicians to practice "defensive medicine", utilization of medical resources beyond its
optimal level of use . . . . Results suggest that a higher degree of malpractice risk increases
the probability of C-section delivery. 1 09
One doctor describes it this way:
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the continuing VBAC saga involves the specter of
huge malpractice claims. Many physicians earnestly want to avoid unnecessary repeat
cesarean operations but fear that they will be found legally liable if any untoward event
occurs during a trial of labor. . . . at least one major medical malpractice insurance
company (Cooperative of American Physicians, Inc., Mutual Protection Trust) already
has mailed a modification of [the VBAC] consent form . . . . No risks for elective repeat
cesarean are listed . . . . Widespread implementation of this or similar consent forms
essentially would mean the end of VBAC. I think that would be a serious mistake . . . . On
a national level, giving up VBAC would mean performing an additional 1 00,000
cesareans every year. It is unlikely this huge number of operations could be performed
without many seriuos complications and perhaps even some maternal deaths. 1 1 0
A disturbing study released in 200 1 identified a number of non-clinical factors as
affecting physician choice to deliver surgically. The aim of the study was to examine
obstetricians' decisions to perform or not to perform cesarean sections, and to elucidate which
factors were most important in deciding the birth mode. The authors of the study identified forty-
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two birthing predictor variables, which were divided into three categories: 1 ) Maternal clinical
characteristics present at time of labor, such as preeclampsia; 2) baby clinical characteristics,
such as the so-called "fetal distress" and malpresentation; and 3) patently non-clinical factors,
such as those related to the physician's practice setting, financial parameters, legal issues, and
pract1t10ner charactenst1cs.
·

·

·

·

Ill

The authors concluded that non-clinical factors were "important" in determining the
birthing mode, and "emphasized that a clinician's decision on the appropriate birthing mode is
based not only on scientific understanding but on other factors, such as the mother' s attitude
toward the birthing mode [and] the malpractice environment . . . . " Physician convenience also
appeared to be a factor: delivery occurring during the day shift at a hospital was found to have
the effect of increasing the likelihood of a cesarean section. The authors interpreted the results as
suggesting possible ways of reducing the cesarean section rate, including by educating the
mother on "advantages of a vaginal birth versus a cesarean section" and "[ e]ducating physicians
about the appropriate use of induction."
In one geographically localized study, it was shown that after issuance of Practice
Bulletin #5, independent practitioners shut down their VBAC practice because they could not
treat patients in their clinic setting and simultaneously attend a VBAC patient at a community
hospital. 1 1 2 The authors of the study provided additional detail on economic considerations
acknowledged but glossed over in the Bulletin itself:
Cesareans produce hospital revenues of $ 1 4,000 to $ 1 7 ,000 each, while vaginal
deliveries produce $ 6,000 to $ 8,000 each. Additionally, the hospital stands to receive
additional revenues because of the increased re-hospitalization rates related to cesarean
111
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delivery. As for the OB/GYN practice? Vaginal deliveries produce no surgical fees. The
record-high cesarean rate is likely to become an abstraction for executives and physicians
who observe its contribution to their bottom lines.
The practical effect of the standard has been to confer exclusive legitimacy for the
performance of VB A Cs upon university and tertiary-level medical centers staffed by
surgeons, anesthesiologists, and surgical teams. These islands of concentrated medical
technology are not conveniently accessible to the overwhelming majority of women who
desire a VBAC and wish not to return to the clinically-discredited era of "once-a
cesarean, always-a-cesarean. " The profit-and-loss practicalities of medical practice
prevent specialists and family practice physicians from leaving their private clinics to
attend at a community hospital the labor of women awaiting a VBAC . . . . Whereas
market restraints are acknowledged for their infliction of economic harm, medical
markets have the unique ability to inflict clinical harm, injury, and even death upon
consumers . . . . The ACOG standard is illustrative of the capacity of a private
organization, exercising peer authority, to impose upon the broader community mandates
generally reserved to governrnent. 1 1 3
Restraint Of Trade Reducing Output Of Services
In order to appreciate fully the extent to which the rights of individuals are violated by
ACOG's influence on VBAC services, one must analyze that influence not only in regard to
American health policy (discussed above), but also in light of American economic policy
.
. .
firee market.
supportmg
a competitive

1 14

American public policy against monopolies is formalized in the federal Sherman Act,
which provides that " [e]very person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 1 1 5 Monopoly power is "the
power to control market prices or exclude competition. " 1 1 6
General Statutory Scheme. The basic antitrust statutes are few in number: The Sherman

Act of 1 890; the Clayton Act, first enacted in 1 9 1 4 and significantly amended in 1 936 by the
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Robinson-Patman Act and in 1 950 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act; 1 1 7 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1 9 1 4.

118

The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,
and also prohibits monopolization. The high value our society places on free trade is illustrated
by the gravity of the sanctions. Violation of the Sherman Act can result in substantial fines and,
for individual transgressors, prison terms. In addition, court orders restraining future violations
are also available. These provisions are enforced primarily by the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department.
The Clayton Act, which deals with specific types of restraints including exclusive dealing
arrangements, tie-in sales, price discrimination, mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking
directorates, carries only civil penalties and is enforced j ointly by both the Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission.
The Federal Trade Commission Act, administered solely by that agency, is a catch-all
enactment which has been construed to include all the prohibitions of the other antitrust laws
and, in addition, may be utilized to fill what may appear to be loopholes in the more explicit
regulatory statutes.

1 16
United States v. E.J. DuPont de Nemours
1 1 7 1 5 U . S .C. § 1 7 .
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Rule of Reason and Per Se Offenses. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every

contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . . " that is unreasonable. This "rule
of reason" is the hallmark of judicial construction of the antitrust laws. The anti-competitive
consequences of a challenged practice are weighed against the business justifications upon which
it is predicated and its putative pro-competitive impact, and a judgment with respect to its
reasonableness is made. 1 1 9
Such an approach has obvious shortcomings. For one thing, reasonableness is an
ephemeral concept, and whether a particular course of conduct will ultimately be found to be
reasonable is not easy to predict when new business arrangements are contemplated. Moreover,
the task of enforcing a regulatory scheme based on such a theory can be staggering.
Trade Associations. "Trade associations, by their very nature, bristle with antitrust

problems. Practically by definition the requisite agreement is present, and the inquiry focuses on
the nature of the members' concerted activity." 1 20 ACOG had been described as "the largest trade
union for obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States" 1 21 and its VBAC recommendation
has been singled out for its restrictive effect on VBAC services: 1 22
In addition to this impact on women and families and birth outcomes, this
recommendation also has a major impact on community-based midwives, family
physicians, birth centers and small hospitals. 1 23
Per se offenses such as price fixing and market division are obviously improper for an
association. Of course, trade associations may properly act, under supervision, in many areas.
119
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Among these, statistical reporting of various types -- past costs, production, sales, and the like -is the most l;lsual. So also, standardization may be a proper association activity as long as
standards which serve to lessen competition are avoided and all members are free to disregard
them.
Monopolization. Antitrust is also concerned with market structure, and it prohibits

structural phenomena likely to substantially lessen competition or to amount to monopolization.
Antitrust is premised on the belief that a competitive economy can best be achieved by
maintaining markets with a significant number of sellers. Hence, to a considerable extent, the
structural aspect of the law focuses on avoiding or remedying the concentration of market power
in a few firms with large market shares.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize, attempt to monopolize,
or conspire to monopolize a line of commerce. It is significant that the statute does not speak in
terms of the existence of a monopoly; rather, its focus is on the act of monopolization, which
requires something more. The offense of monopolization , which is not purely structural, has two
elements: ( 1 ) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power.
Monopoly power. This is the power to control prices or exclude competition. As a
practical matter, such power is measured by the alleged monopolist's share of the relevant
market. Absolute monopoly in the economic sense -- 1 00 percent of the market -- is a rare
phenomenon, raising the question of how large a share a firm must possess to come within the
statutory concept. Although there is no hard and fast rule, any market share of 50 percent or
higher is sufficient to be of concern.
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Willful acquisition or maintenance. Once monopoly power is found the question

remains: Was it willfully acquired or maintained? This is ephemeral and difficult to determine.
The statute does not require that monopoly power be abused or intentionally exercised to drive
out competition, although such conduct, if present, is sufficient to make out a violation. Nor does
the element of willfulness entail an evil intent to eliminate competitors. Conscious acts designed
to further or maintain a monopoly market position will suffice.
Attempt to Monopolize. Section 2 of the Sherman Act also prohibits attempts to

monopolize by companies that do not possess monopoly power but engage in anticompetitive
conduct designed to achieve it. To prove an attempt to monopolize, one must establish that the
defendant had a specific intent to achieve monopoly; that it acted in an anticompetitive manner
designed to injure its actual or potential competition; and that there was a dangerous probability
that monopoly power would in fact be achieved. Since companies that actually possess
monopoly power are

an

industrial rarity, most Section 2 litigation involves allegations of

attempts to monopolize; and it is the "dangerous probability of success" element on which the
resolution of most cases turns.
Anti-Trust And Birth
Profit maximization has approximately the same presence in health care as it does
banking, auto sales, the practice of law, and other market niches. 1 24 As noted above, ACOG is
functionally a trade union. Its VBAC policies resonate in the anti-trust context. The so-called
"clinical" restraints on VBAC services have driven many qualified competitors out of the
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market, particularly direct-entry midwives and family-practice physicians. This in turn has the
inevitable effect of making such providers effectively unavailable to women who would
otherwise utilize their services.
The problem is compounded by the refusal of many hospitals to permit VBAC on the
premises except pursuant to the ACOG Practice Bulletin Guidelines, for fear of compromising
their health insurance coverage or increasing their malpractice insurance rates, thus forcing a
woman who would prefer vaginal delivery or home birth to submit herself to the heightened risk
of surgical intervention in a hospital setting. This also effectively limits her selection of care
providers:
[M]ost [direct-entry] midwives can only practice outside the hospital and most [certified
nurse midwives] can only practice inside of hospitals. Thus . . . to choose a particular kind
of midwife is also to choose a particular place of birth. 1 25
Even more, to choose a non-physician care provider is to choose the place of birth; and to choose
a non-ob-gyn provider (even a family physician) is to choose a place of birth - if such providers
can be found who are willing to buck the ACOG trend.
In 2003 the ACOG Committee on Ethics issued a statement declaring elective cesareans
to be "ethical," thereby providing its members with "an ethical pass to perform a procedure that
is proven more dangerous to women and babies." 126 ACOG acknowledged cesarean risk in a
release summarizing the results of a study that found "a cesarean delivery significantly increased
a woman's risk of experiencing a pregnancy-related death (3 5 . 9 deaths per 1 00,000 deliveries

M.D., J.D., Uninformed Consent (Hampton Roads Publishing 1 999); Eugene D. Robin, M.D., Matters of Life and
Death: Risks vs. Benefits of Medical Care (W. H. Freeman & Co. 1 984).
1 25 Davis-Floyd, R., Mainstreaming Midwives: The Politics of Change, Routledge, New York 2006, pp. 32-3 3 ;
Wagner, M . , Born Jn the USA: How A Broken Maternity System Must B e Fixe To Put Women A n d Children First,
University of California Press, B erkeley, 2006, p. 534.
6
1 2 Myers, M., "ACOG 's Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Standard: A M arket Restraint Without Remedy?" 49 S.D. L.
REV. 526, 527 (2003); ICAN In the News, ICAN Criticizes ACOG's Statement on Ethical Cesareans (Nov. 1 0,
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with a live-birth outcome) compared to a woman who delivered vaginally (9.2 deaths per
1 00,000). 127
On close inspection, it is not difficult to discern the economic turf battle that is raging:
Maternity care is big business in the U.S., especially for hospitals. Of total hospital stays
for women, 25% are for pregnancy and childbirth ("Care of Women in U.S. Hospitals,
2000" HCUP Fact Book No. 3). In 1 999, delivery accounted for about 270
hospitalizations for every 1 0,000 women (Women' s Health USA, 2002). Obstetricians
are important to a hospital' s financial success for a number of reasons, including the fact
that they influence around 1 1 %, or $30 million, of inpatient charges through referrals to
other physicians within the hospital (Hanold, K C, "OB/GYNs Offer a Rich Source of
Referrals" MHS Fall 2002). In other words, obstetrical care is still a major marketing
tool for hospitals; when a woman needs hospitalization for herself or for a family
member, she will tend to stick with the hospital where she gave birth. . . .
When we think about costs and "cost effectiveness" we usually think about the cost to us,
the consumers (or to our insurance carrier or HMO). We can see that our costs will vary
by setting:
Fees

Cesarean
Section
$9 ,300-$26,000
Total
$2,300-$5 ,000
$3,500-$8,300
$4,300-$ 1 6,000 (includes
average 4-day
hospital stay)
(O' Mara, P. Having a Baby, Naturally. 2003 . p. 322. Based on figures published in
1 999.)
Home Birth

Birth Center

Hospital

Consider that 99% of births occur in hospitals, of which more than 1li are cesarean
sections, and that home birth costs as little as one sixth the cost of an uncomplicated
vaginal birth in the hospital. . . .
There is an unspoken assumption that physicians ' decisions should not be
questioned, so there is no regulation by disinterested parties. There is virtually no
consumer pressure. There are no restraints on anti-competitive practices. There are no
meaningful consumer protections. There is no accountability for the health and well
being of mothers and babies.
Despite these facts, bringing anti-trust policy to bear on provision of birthing services has
proven difficult, especially where the "injured" parties are not economic competitors deprived of
a livelihood, but patients who are effectively denied access to a certain type of service. Doctors
12 7
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enter into agreements with hospitals, insurers and practice partners by virtue of which they may
be held accountable to those entities; there has been little in the way of regulatory or other
institutional mechanisms to hold doctors accountable to patients, however. 1 28
Under most state laws, a hospital's refusal to appoint a health care professional to its
medical staff is not subject to judicial review because of the understandable reluctance of judges
to substitute their judgment for that of decision makers in private organizations. 129
Even direct Sherman Act challenges often fail as a vehicle due to the difficulties inherent
in proving key elements of such a claim. Generally speaking, the continuing reliance of federal
courts on economic theory in antitrust cases has had a profound impact, because the economic
approach demands proof that output is restricted in order to show the required foreclosure of
competition and, thus, establish an antitrust violation. 1 30
According to Amnesty International, nursing and midwifery services contribute to
international health improvement inter alia by promoting gender equality via educating girls and
women about health issues; by reducing child and maternal mortality; and by delivering maternal
and child health services. Yet these practitioners are stymied, and therefore their would-be
clients denied these benefits, when competition with ob-gyns is suppressed in favor of a medical
monopoly not justified by the medical evidence.
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Democratic, non-legislative methods are sometimes relied on to correct monopolistic
tendencies. One important method in a free society is the use of exit, that is, consumers exiting
from one provider to "purchase" medical services elsewhere. 1 3 1
The women' s health movement has been cited as one example o f the "exit" correction to
monopolistic tendencies. 132 Yet exit is not a feasible remedy where monopolistic restraints have
thwarted alternative providers. Doctors "act as gatekeepers for many health care resources." 133
While the women's health movement has had some positive effects on medicine, change
has been slow and partial. Professional power is still strong and often determines how
health services are performed. Despite the women's movement's efforts to allow women
greater control over childbirth, trends exist that counter such control. For example, births
by cesarian section in the United States have increased steadily from 4.5% in 1 965 to
24% in 1 986 and stayed around this level until 1 99 1 . Despite efforts by women's groups
and consumers, women frequently have been forced to have cesarean sections against
their will . . . the women's movement has had only limited effects on changing
practices. 1 34
One silver lining: antitrust jurisprudence is gradually evolving to inquire whether certain
conduct reduces the output of products or services, as opposed to a stricter economic-impact
analysis (Sfikas 1 99 1 ). Viewed through this lens, the ACOG VBAC conduct runs counter to the
American policy of anti-monopolistic provision of services.
As discussed supra, the so-called "clinical" constraints on VBAC services have driven
many qualified competitors out of the market, particularly direct-entry midwives, nurse
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practitioners and family physicians. This in turn has the inevitable effect of making such
providers effectively unavailable to women who would otherwise utilize their services.
This, then, is the nexus between the anti-competitive nature of ACOG policies, and the
human rights of individual American women: deprivation of entire portions of the maternity-care
spectrum routinely available to women in other countries. Even in those instances when are able
to avail themselves of a direct-entry midwife, for example, their care may be compromised due
to factors beyond their control. Physician resistance to midwifery and out-of-hospital birth may
result in denigration of the pregnant women involved, or even denial of services in the form of
refusal to accept an emergency transport to hospital from a home birth due to failure to progress,
medical emergency, or exhaustion of the mother: midwives
and their clients sometimes suffer in extreme ways from the effects of [negative]
stereotypes, as the home-to-hospital transport stories . . . describe. The negative reactions
midwives encounter when they transport a client to the hospittal (not to mention those
they also encounter in state legislatures) vivify the problematic nature of the interface
between midwives and medical practitioners . . . . It is one thing to proudly hold a
countercultural space in which women can make alternative choices, and another to
watch your clients suffer the effects of the negative stereotyping of midwives. Thus . . .
they are keenly aware of the need . . . to protect their clients from being medically
mistreated because they chose a home-birth midwife. 135
It is generally recognized that the interests of the consumer are usually "better served by
competitive forces in the market place." 1 36 "There is a generalized concern that expresses itself
in various governmental policies, some being part of decisional and statutory law, against
combinations and agreements that operate to restrain or encumber trade. 1 37
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In this sense, ACOG's activity violates the rights of pregnant women not only as patients,
but as consumers of goods and services in a free market; and it is doing so on a patently
discriminatory basis: pregnant are singled out for this particular brand of abasement and
jeopardy.
The U.S. Department Of Health and Human Services has recommended collaboration
between physicians and midwives as one avenue of enhancing availability of birthing services. 1 38
According to its "Commentary On Obstetricians And Midwives:"
In 1 993, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) established
an initiative to encourage the use of collaborative models in women's health care . . . .
Patients respond positively to care provided in collaborative practices, as has now been
confirmed by ACOG studies of patient satisfaction . . . . Rather than suggest that one type
of non-physician provider can deliver the majority of women's health care unaided,
ACOG advocates collaborative practice by a variety of providers who, working with
physicians, can best serve women's health needs . . . . We believe, therefore, that the most
effective systems are not one provider over another but collaborative teams of physicians
and advanced practice professionals combining their skills to maximize treatment and
educational strategies that can improve the health of women.
ACOG and its members have moved advisedly to restrict the output of birthing services
to women not only in the ways discussed above (VBAC restrictions, promotion of c-sections
generally, etc.), but also by targeting midwives to discourage their provision of birthing services.
These efforts include educational or propaganda efforts (depending on one ' s point of view)
condemning home birth as a form of child abuse, and otherwise discouraging out-of-hospital
births.
Beyond that, ACOG through its divisions has taken concrete steps to thwart the provision
of non-physician birthing services. For example, the Wisconsin Section of ACOG issued a notice
to its members that it "would like to document any adverse outcomes that physicians might
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encounter in their practice by patients who are assisted by professional midwives." 1 39 To what
use might such anecdotal reports be put? ACOG is the self-described "voice of women' s health"
(albeit without benefit of the blessing of the women for whom it claims to speak) and as such
urges its members "to become more active at every level of government". 140 ACOG educates its
members that it is "[ mJost difficult to have an effective legislative presence without a dedicated
lobbyist" and that a state section "must develop its legislative committee and its legislative
agenda before hiring a lobbyist". 1 4 1 ACOG has an active "Government Relations Committee"
that sponsors an Annual Lobbyist Roundtable and encourages the "growing" of "ACOG' s
advocacy in the state capitals" to defeat legislative initiatives that would legalize, regulate or
otherwise encourage the practice and professionalization of midwifery:
On the issue of midwives, the committee discussed how the lack of comparative data on
midwife-assisted birth outcomes hinders our efforts as ob-gyns, and explored ways to
assist Fellows in responding to midwife bills in their state. It was proposed that ACOG
collect anecdotes from Fellows who have been back-up or on call for midwife-assisted
deliveries that ended in an adverse outcome. 142
It is no surprise that ACOG did not call for "anecdotes" about good-outcome midwife
services, nor for bad-outcome ob-gyn deliveries. Negative publicity is typically generated by a
bad-outcome midwife-attended birth, but is "rarely applied to negative hospital outcomes". 1 43 A
leading scholar on the anthropology of reproduction in the United States, Robbie Davis-Floyd,
writes of the "damaging stereotypes hospital practitioners tend to create and disseminate about
direct-entry midwives" and observes:
A further barrier to midwifery care has to with the negative publicity that occurs almost
every time there is a bad outcome at a home birth. Deaths in the hospital of baby or
139
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mother are rarely publicized because the hospital constitutes the cultural standard for
safety, and physicians tend to protect their own from public view. Thus a death at home
rings loud cultural alarm bells, sounding the culturally ingrained message that home birth
is an irresponsible choice for mothers, and that home-birth midwives must be far less
competent than hospital-based practitioners. 1 44
One can readily perceive the damage this wreaks on the midwives themselves,
emotionally, professionally and financially. More to the point of this paper, however, is the
damage done the laboring mother who has exercised her right to choose the services of a
midwife and give birth at home. Both midwives "and their clients suffer in extreme ways from
the effects of such stereotypes." 1 45
One of the most significant and challenging of these barriers is hospital and physician
resistance to midwives, which is sometimes purely economically motivated, and
sometimes motivated by an erroneous belief that midwives are not really competent
professionals - at least not as competent as the doctors themselves. CNMs [Certified
Nurse Midwives] experience physician or hospital administrator resistance when they are
overscrutinized (usually when someone is looking for a reason to get rid of them) or fired
outright in large numbers, or when physicians refuse to provide backup for their birth
center, homebirth practices, and even hospital practices, and/or harrass the few physicians
that do . . . .
DEMs [direct entry midwives] experience hysician resistance in the form of the same
refusal of backup care, insulting treatment in the hospital when they transport a patient,
investigation of their practices by physicians determined to shut them down . . . and heavy
lobbying by professional medical organizations against legislation to legalize and
regulate DEMs in various states. 146
According to another observer,
most obstetricians are vehemently opposed to midwives and have gone to great lengths to
drive them out of business. Far beyond a mere territorial battle between two groups of
health care professionals, the persecution of midwives in this country has taken on the
fervor of an old-fashioned witch hunt. The result is fewer options for women. In many
regions of the United States, a pregnant woman who wants the care of a midwife can't
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get it unless she's willing to go outside mainstreamt health care channels, and, in some
areas, even risk being persecuted and/or prosecuted herself. 1 47
Change Proposal: Transparency and Litigation
OPENNESS, honest and complete OPENNESS 
that is the first condition of health in all societies.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Changing physicians' practice patterns to reduce cesarean birth rates has not been easily
accomplished. Government agencies, professional associations, physician leaders,
managed care organizations, and consulting groups all have struggled with this issue for
more than 20 years. Although the national and state rates are now 1 0% to 20% below
their peak in 1 988 (which translates to a 1 % to 3% reduction in the total cesarean rate),
most are not near the national Healthy Person 2000 goal of 1 5%. . . . midwife-centered
care has led to some of the lowest cesarean birth rates in the United States . . . . changing
behaviors of highly educated adults is not an easy task. 148
The American founders believed "in the enlightened choice of the people, free from the
interference of a policeman's intrusive thumb or a judge's heavy hand." Ginzburg v. US. , 3 83
U.S. 463 , 498 (Stewart, J.). The free flow of information is a matter not only of legal rights, but
also of good public policy in the realm of scientific endeavors. Andrei Sakharov won both the
Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Prize for Physics. He stated:
I am likewise convinced that freedom of conscience, together with the other civic rights,
provides the basis for scientific progress and constitutes a guarantee that scientific
advances will not be used to despoil mankind, providing the basis for economic and
social progress, which in tum is a political guarantee for the possibility of an effective
defense of social rights . . . . people [are] deprived of contact with nature and of normal
human lives in the traditional sense of the word . . . . We need reform, not revolution. We
need a pliant, pluralist, tolerant community, which selectively and tentatively can bring
about a free, undogmatic use of the experiences of all social systems . . . . [L]ike faint
glimmers of light in the dark, we have emerged for a moment from the nothingness of
dark unconsciousness of material existence. We must make good the demands of reason
and create a life worthy of ourselves and of the goals we only dimly perceive.
(Sakharov 1 975).
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Science provides the moniker for one offspring of the free-speech evolution:
"transparency." To scientists, a transparent object is one that does not conceal what is on the
other side. To social scientists, transparency in government and in non-governmental institutions
of public importance is a counterpoint to secrecy, and facilitates openness and participation
through public accessibility, review and debate. Transparency discourages abuse of power by
those who hold it, inter alia by making it easier to discern poor judgment or intentional wrongdoing on the part of decision-makers, and hold them accountable to improve the system.
Transparency has been applied in many different contexts to promote accountability
within government. For example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts rely heavily on required
disclosures and the transparency of bankruptcy proceedings to avert corruption and promote
equity, and similar techniques are utilized in family courts vis-a-vis distribution of the marital
estate. 149 The U.S. General Accounting Office has called for greater transparency in federal
spending and record-keeping to promote accountability. 1 50
The principle of transparency is applied not only to governments, but to corporations and
other non-governmental entities within a country. The call for enhanced transparency has risen in
volume since the Enron disaster. Even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission joined the
fray. "SEC warns investors need transparent disclosure in wake of Enron debacle." 1 5 1
According to one scholar, a "physician-based healthcare system that has grown beyond
critical bounds . . . obscures the political conditions that render society healthy; and it tends to
mystify and to expropriate the power of the individual to heal himself and to shape his or her
environment." 152
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The doctrine of informed consent, as applied in the context of childbirth, creates a duty of
disclosure upon a physician to present her patient with information on not only the material risks
involved in undergoing natural childbirth, but also the risks associated with having a cesarean
section. 1 53 In the childbirth context, physicians' "bias towards cesarean sections may influence
their ability to provide adequate information about childbirth methods. Physicians who find it in
their best interest to perform the surgery may reveal incomplete information to a patient deciding
between a cesarean or natural childbirth. This practice violates the physician's fiduciary duty to
her patient." 1 54
Transparency is called for in the larger American birth context, as well: free access to the
data and procedures utilized by ACOG, as the standard-setter for American birthing practices, in
its formulation of clinical recommendations.
Not surprisingly, the corporate world resists opening its secrets to outside scrutiny. It
often cites the "trade secret privilege" to justify drawing a veil over its workings. The trade
secret doctrine, however, is an "oddball" privilege 1 5 5 . A leading commentator has observed:
[T]he privilege is difficult to justify, especially when the law does not recognize
privileges for many more deserving sorts of information; e.g. , parent child
communications. 1 56
To say that the basis of trade secret law is "commercial ethics"
begs the question of its justification by assuming business secrecy is justified. As the
example of science suggests, it is quite possible to imagine social institutions that involve
the same competing values of individualism, competition and innovation as the
commercial world yet which embrace an ethics of openness. 1 5 7
.

•

.

1 53 Physicians are required to disclose ( 1 ) the risks of a particular method of treatment; (2) alternative methods of
treatment; (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment; and (4) the results likely to occur if the
patient remains untreated. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 7 8 1 -82 (D.C. Cir. 1 972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1 064
( 1 972); Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 5 5 8, 5 6 1 -62 (D.C. 1 9 82); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 2 1 1 , 2 1 7 (Wash. 1 974).
1 54 Bates, K., "CESAREAN SECTION EPIDEMIC: DEFINING THE PROBLEM--APPROACHING
SOLUTIONS", 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 3 89, 400 ( 1 995).
1 55 Wright, et al. , Federal Practice And Procedure §5642, n. 1 and accompanying text.
1 56 Wright, et al. , Federal Practice And Procedure, § 5 644, n. 1 48 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
1 57 Wright, supra, § 5642, nn. 54-57 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
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One should resist the temptations of naivete and acknowledge that the talk of trade
secrets and confidential business information may well be used to "protect the public" from
knowledge important to public well-being.
Corporations have tried to use trade secret claims to conceal workplace hazards, the
ingredients of harmful products, and discriminatory hiring practices as well as to prevent
inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency, to keep information from unions
that would assist them in carrying out their collective bargaining responsibilities, and to
prevent the release of regulatory data. Although corporate lawyers made exaggerated
claims about their fears of industrial espionage, there is probably cause to believe they
were more concerned that the public would learn how their cozy relationships with
federal agencies frustrated legislative eff01is to protect the health and safety of citizens. 1 5 8
ACOG materials are limited, fo r the most part, to its own members, with further
dissemination prohibited. The author of this paper was denied access to ACOG committee
reports and minutes of meetings relating to development of VBAC standards, despite a
willingness to comply with any purchase requirements. 1 59 There appears to be no public library
in the country that has a complete set - or anywhere near it - of ACOG-generated documents,
including those consulted or developed in relation to the 1 999 "reevaluation" of the VBAC
standards in response to "malpractice suit" concern. The "anecdotal" evidence ACOG gathers on
midwife-attended births with bad outcomes is not available to the public.
The July 5, 200 1 , issue of the New England Journal of Medicine contained a study and an
accompanying editorial that focused international media attention on the VBAC issue and "set
off a flurry of activity on internet sites and in doctor's offices all over the world. " 1 60 The
headlines suggested that new research supported repeat cesareans over VBAC, causing a number
of physicians to opine that repeat cesareans were as safe or safer than vaginal birth. Less
15
8

Wright, supra, § 5642, nn. 2 1 3 -22 1 and accompanying text (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Personal communications with ACOG home office research service, July and August, 2007.
1 60
Sheryl Stolberg, A Risk is found in Natural Birth After Cesarean, N.Y. Times, July 5, 200 I ; Rita Rubin, Vaginal
Births After C-Section Risk Uterine Damage, USA Today, July 5, 200 1 ; Deborah Josefson, Vaginal Delivery After

1 59
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attention was paid to subsequent attacks on both the study and the Journal editorial, written by
Michael E. Greene, M.D. The study contained "little new or groundbreaking-information and
relied on questionable data collection.

11 1 6 1

" [T]ake a closer look, " wrote Jill MacCorkle, contending that overuse of medical
intervention in childbirth has transformed ordinary vaginal birth into major surgery and arguing
that a "careful critique exposes the limitations of the current medical model of childbirth and
questions whether the model holds any credibility for women. " 162 A noted critic of current
obstetrical practice, Dr. Flamm, observed, "Even the charts of the women believed to have
experienced uterine rupture, the very focus of this study, were apparently not available to for
review."
As of this writing, Congress is considering the Healthcare Truth and Transparency Act of
2007, introduced in the House on May 1 0, 2007 by Rep. Jim McDermott, MD (D-WA) and Rep.
John Sullivan (R-OK). The Act is touted as a major step forward in prohibiting misleading and
deceptive advertising or representation in healthcare services, and will require certain healthcare
providers to clearly state their qualifications. The bill also authorizes the nation's highest
consumer protection body, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to take action against
deceptive conduct. Ironically, however, the Act may actually exacerbate existing problems
arising from medical monopolies and restraint of trade in the maternity care spectrum. Indeed,
the industry reaction seems to acknowledge this, at least implicitly. For example, one trade group
of licensed medical providers has lamented: "In this day and age, Americans are overwhelmed

Cesarean Section Triples Risk of Uterine Rupture, BMJ website at http://www.bmj .com; Eric Dyson, ACNM Calls
for Definitive VBAC Study, Press Release, American College of Nurse-Midwives, July 5, 200 1 .
161
Jill MacCorkle, Fighting VBAC-lash : Critiquing Current Research, Mothering, Jan-Feb. , 2002 available at
http://www.mothering.com/ l l -O-O/ l l -4-0html/ l l -4-0/vbaclash.shtml.
1 62
Jill MacCorkle, Fighting VBAC-lash: Critiquing Current Research, Mothering, Jan-Feb., 2002 available at
http://www.mothering.com/ 1 1 -0-0/ 1 1 -4-0html/1 1 -4-0/vbaclash.shtml.
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with information regarding their healthcare options, whether through the media, or the Internet,
or even word-of-mouth," said AAO-HNS Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer,
David R. Nielsen, MD, FACS . "We want to make sure that patients and the general public are
not being misled when they seek care. This means protecting those patients from individuals who
are not being clear about the exact nature of their medical qualifications."
Joining the AAO-HNS in supporting the Healthcare Truth and Transparency Act are
leading professional associations representing diverse physician specialties, including the
American Psychiatric Association, the Academy of Ophthalmology, the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, the American Medical Association,
the American Osteopathic Association, the American Society of Anesthesiologists, and the
American Society of Plastic Surgeons.
Ironically, their preferred approach to ostensibly increasing transparency is not to
increase public access to the inner workings of, and documents generated by, these
organizations, but rather to create a new disclosure and anti-marketing onus for those outside the
charmed College/Society circles: a public posting of "qualifications" which, according to
traditional physician wisdom, could readily be spun as "disqualifications" to herd errant, overly
inforrned patients back into the physician fold.
Litigation. As discussed above, ACOG is already keenly sensitive to potential legal

liability arising from the dreaded malpractice lawsuits. This aspect of its corporate sub-culture
may be useful in procuring greater respect for, and compliance with, the human rights of women
who come within the purview of ACOG practice bulletins, guidelines and practices.
Indeed, ACOG is certainly sophisticated enough not only to fear the law, but to know and
use it:
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ACOG also uses fear of litigation to control doctors and hospitals. If doctors and
hospitals �o against one of their recommendations, they are more vulternable to
litigation. 63
Ob-gyns are already trained to fear the devil they know: malpractice lawsuits. They devil
they don't know - but which could prove even more fearsome - is the human-rights lawsuit, for
procural of patient consent absent full disclosure of the non-medical motivations embedded in
American birthing recommendations, and in violation of consumers' right to unrestrained trade
in the maternity-care field.
Conclusion
Current State Of American Birth Recommendations Violates International Human
Rights Norms. "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and well-

being" . This is a generally accepted international norm. In the U . S . , it is unduly difficult and
dangerous for a woman to give birth, to seek freely her choice of maternity-care providers, and to
do so on an informed basis. This endangers her health and well-being.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "recognize[s] the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health" . Patently, the U.S. has the resources to provide - and, in many medical specialties, does
provide - the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Birthing is an exception,
as demonstrated by disparity between c-section rates in the U . S . and other industrialized
countries, the rate of unnecessary c-sections, and the maternal death rate.
According to WHO, "the right to health should be understood as extending beyond health
care to access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive
health." The secrecy surrounding ACOG standard-setting and underlying medical evidentiary
1 63

Wagner, M., Born Jn the USA : How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixe To Put Women And Children First,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 2006, p. 27.

57

basis defeats efforts to provide an appropriate education, and full and fair information, to women
faced with birthing decisions.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
requires "all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women . . . in particular to
ensure . . . access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of
families, including information and advice on family planning" . This has not occurred in the
United States, due in significant part to ACOG's restriction of access to the information and
motivations on which it relies to formulate national standards for maternal care and birthing
options.
The Preamble to the Constitution of WHO provides: "The enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. " The Convention on
the Rights of the Child requires subscribing countries to "take appropriate measures to ensure
appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers" . Both these standards are violated
by the unnecessarily high American rate of c-section and maternal death, and the de facto
discrimination against pregnant women in relation to their ability to make informed birthing
choices, then seek and obtain the services they require.
Current State Of American Birth Recommendations Violates American Human
Rights Norms. Every person has a liberty interest, constitutionally protected, in her own body.

No person can be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process. Even with the belief
that it is safer for mother and/or baby for birth to occur in a hospital, no action may be taken to
interfere with parental choice unless there is a hearing, with adequate due-process safeguards,
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forcing the accuser to carry the burden of proof, allowing both sides to be heard, and resulting in
a hearing based on the evidence.
Every person is constitutionally entitled to a presumption of mental competence
(comparable to presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings) until there is an adjudication - meeting due process requirements -- to the contrary. There is no exception to this rule for
pregnant women; they do not lose their legal presumption of mental competence by becoming
pregnant.
A parent is presumed to be the legal representative of her child, unless and until the state
-- in compliance with the due process clause -- terminates or restricts parental rights, including
the right to make medical choices for her child. The general constitutional rule is that, unless a
mother is proven to be "unfit", the state cannot interfere. If there are allegations of unfitness,
such as abuse or neglect, the accuser must bring the appropriate charges and prove its case before
interfering with maternal choice.
Therefore, a mother's right to make medical decisions for herself cannot be intruded upon
except through proper adjudication, in compliance with the due process clause, that she is unfit
to make those decisions. There is no legal principle that would by fiat exclude pregnant women
from these rules of law.
Importance of Transparency As Partial Remedy. Since the founders' eighteenth-

century antipathy to government restrictions on free speech, their ardor for the "enlightened
choice of the people" has evolved into a broader romance with the free flow of information
throughout society in general:
All forms of exclusion and secrecy are inimical to the principles of openness and
participation . . . . Rules that limit access, encourage secrecy or curtail participation must
be strictly construed because they run counter to the great countervailing principles of
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openness and participation. A facile or insouciant resort to pragmatic remedies soon
results in the tail wagging the dog. 1 64
Rewarding the (presumed) superior intellect and investment of physicians via greater
compensation and prestige, at the expense of pregnant women, does not j ustify current American
birth practices.
While it is true that our culture generally approves of persons whose cleverness enables
them to surpass others, one has to look only to the "sucker-punch'', the attack on Pearl
Harbor, and the law of fraud to see that at some point this admiration for the clever passes
over into sympathy for the justifiably ignorant. . . . . It would be enough to answer that we
are all "free-riders" on the intelligence and effort of our ancestors. 1 65
Importance Of Litigation As Partial Remedy. Certainly it is fashionable to deride

lawyers (amongst whom the author counts herself), and to lament the "litigious nature" of our
society, as doctors - particularly ob-gyns - are fond of doing, fomenting fear with talk of the
"malpractice crisis" and other bogeymen. This is a red herring.
Defensive medicine is harmful to pregnant women. Ob-gyns exist to serve women,
primarily pregnant women. Are we to believe that the ob-gyn specialty would cease to exist
when the financial benefits outweigh the financial risk? This borders on the fatuous. In other
words, despite the hue and cry orchestrated by the well-oiled ACOG political machine, ob-gyns
are still making money they view as adequate to compensate them for their work -- or else we
would have no ob-gyns.
Is it so radical to believe that practicing good medicine, rather than defensive medicine,
would be its own reward, both financially and emotionally? As Dr. Wagner points out:

1 64 Schwartz, et al. v. Celestial Seasonings, et al. , Civ.Action No. 95-K- 1 045, Order Denying Motion To File
Exhibits Under Seal (Document No. 93), Kane, J., (D.Colo. January 22, 1 998) (articulating "my responsibility as a
judge to avoid concealment of the judicial process form public view" at I ), citing M M v. Zavaras, 939 F. Supp.
799, 80 1 (D. Colo. 1 996) (any privacy interest plaintiff had in remaining anonymous was "decisively outweighed"
by the countervailing public interest in openness).
165
Wright, et al. , Federal Practice And Procedure, sec. 5642, nn. 54-47 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
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Yes, most American obstetricians have been sued, and yes, there are high insurance
premiums, but I don't believe these two realities are enough to explain obstetricians'
extreme attitude . . . . In an obstetrician' s daily world, everyone with whom he comes in
contact looks up to him and follows his orders. In a courtroom, an obstetrician may even
be looked down on . . . . [B]eing an obstetrician in the obstetric world is like living as an
animal with no natural predators. A courtroom is not in the obstetric world. Predators lurk
in the courtroom. 166
The rule of law is a fundamental value in this country. It forces people to account for their
behavior. It is powerful and, for the most part, positive.
There is already a substantial body of law on medical malpractice. There is already a
substantial constitutional j urisprudence on bodily autonomy and integrity.
Invocation of human-rights norms - both personal and economic -- in relation to
American birth choices and services is the case yet to be brought, the plaintiff yet to be heard.
That means the j ury is still out.

Respectfully submitted,
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